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Abstract
Title of Dissertation: Organizational Subcultures and Safety Culture in Shipping:
Case study of Algeria.
Degree:

Master of Science

This study intends to contribute to the improvement of safety culture of the shipping
industry. The study investigates the existence of different subcultures of safety on
board ships as a result of differing organizational cultures in shipping companies. In
particular, it investigates the way the organizational safety management contributes in
creating such safety culture differences in the same shipping company between its
different divisions, e.g., international and domestic shipping activities, and therefore
affecting safety on board ships.
The study employed an exploratory mixed method design. The qualitative exploratory
part, consisting of six interviews with maritime experts, assisted in formulating the
research hypothesis and constructing the survey questionnaire. Subsequently, the
study was undertaken on a sample of 549 seafarers in Algeria, using the constructed
safety culture survey questionnaire. The psychometric priorities of the questionnaire
(i.e., validity and reliability) were assessed using Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA)
and Cronbach Alpha, respectively. Qualitative data was analyzed using content
analysis of the interviews, while quantitative data analysis used the Statistical Package
for the Social Science (SPSS), including several statistical tests and analyses, among
others correlation and regression analyses.
The study yielded seven factors that affect and differ safety culture between oceangoing and domestic ships; three organizational factors, including top management
commitment, safety management system, safety related human resources; and four
shipboard safety climate factors, including local management commitment, crew
psychological safety, crew job satisfaction, and crew safety behavior. In contrast,
external supervision, such as port and flag State controls, has shown marginal
influence on safety culture in this study.
The study indicates that differing the organizational safety management (i.e., the
organizational factors) lead to differing safety culture on board ships (i.e., shipboard
safety climate factors). This fact led to state that organizational subcultures in
managing safety led to respective safety subcultures.
Furthermore, the study indicates that the organization’s top management commitment
and the adequate safety management system moderate the impact of deficient local
management involvement in safety. However, the study yielded negative impact of the
qualified human resources on safety when they exposed to their job dissatisfaction and
to bad psychological safety conditions on board ships.
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Based on the findings of the study, a safety culture model is graphically presented,
which when implemented will have the potential to enhance safety culture in shipping
companies, including those engaged in different shipping activities or operated by
different entities.
KEYWORDS: Safety culture, Safety climate, Organizational culture, Organizational
Subcultures, Safety subculture, Safety management, Shipping in Algeria.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1.

Background
It is often said that safety regulations are not followed adequately because of

people’s negative attitudes (Mearns et al., 2001). However, usually, individuals’
attitudes result from the culture of organizations (Sexton & Klinect, 2017; Choudhry
et al., 2007; Flin, 2007; Rundmo et al., 1998; Cox & Cox, 1991). Specifically, as an
aspect of organizational culture that reflects the organization’s priority placed on
safety over other competing concerns such as efficiency and costs, safety culture
shapes the individuals’ motivation to engage in safe behaviors (Bisbey et al., 2021).
Therefore, as a proactive safety approach, safety culture is seen in various industries
as an effective strategy for improving safety, especially in high-risk sectors.
Shipping, one of the world's riskiest industries, has also shifted to adopt this
proactive approach toward safety through developing an appropriate safety culture.
Indeed, under the auspices of the IMO, since the introduction of the ISM Code, safety
culture has been widely recognized as one of the most important aspects of maritime
safety. In particular, by introducing the ISM Code in 1994, the IMO aimed to create a
safety-oriented culture in shipping by establishing Safety Management Systems
(SMSs) (Anderson, 2015; Oltedal, 2011).
However, although the maritime industry’s SMSs have positively influenced
safety on board ships (Jung, 2021), human error is still blamed in 80 to 85% of
maritime accidents (Hasanspahić et al., 2021; Baker & McCafferty, 2005). An
inadequate safety culture, specifically, is still revealed amongst the main factors
leading to human errors. For instance, in recent years, shipping has witnessed tragic
accidents, among others, the Italian cruise ship Costa Concordia accident in January
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2012, the Norman Atlantic fire and the sinking of the South Korean M/S Sewol in 2014,
the grounding of the UK- registered general cargo Lysblink Seaways and the Bahamas
registered- passenger ship Hamburg in 2015, and the Liberian -registered general
cargo ship “SMN Explorer”, in February 2018. In particular, safety investigations of
these accidents revealed several safety failures that could be traced back to
organizational failures relative to safety culture, including crew non-compliance with
safety management systems.
Therefore, there is a rising need for organizational safety policy to support
safety culture in shipping. As stated by a principal inspector of the Marine Accident
Investigation Branch (MAIB), the SMSs as a key part of the ISM code philosophy, its
success and failure depend, to a large extent, on the organizational safety culture of
shipping companies (Withington, 2011).
From another side, the ship’s reliability and the related regulations that are
aimed to improve ships’ safety have introduced more complexity to the work
environment on board ships. As a result, Today's ship is considered a highly complex
socio-technical system (Aylward, 2020; de Vries, 2017), in which the
interrelationships between humans and technology are of prime importance in
performing operations. Furthermore, humans in their interaction within the system are
key to success and failure of the entire system’s safety (Woods & Hollnagel, 2006). In
the light of this fact, in shipping, recognizing the complexity of the socio-technical

process of ships has led to more focus on the concept of “safety culture” (Griffioen
et al., 2021; Håvold & Nesset, 2009).

In practice, attaining positive safety culture that yields tangible safety
benefits on board ships depends strongly on the shipping company and the
shipboard interactions and commitment toward safety. Indeed, the organization’s
commitment toward improving safety has shown a great influence on safety culture
in various studies, e.g., Li et al., 2021; Horwitz, 2017; Flin & Murdey, 2007; Neal &
Griffin, 2000. However, such a commitment at the organizational level is intrinsically
linked to the safety-related organizational culture. In shipping, this latter - the
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organizational culture should particularly support and enable the shipping

companies’ safety management systems (SMSs) to improve, through selfcommitment toward safety, principally from the active actors in the front line of
maritime safety, the seafarers. This can be achieved mainly if the organizational
culture can support and enable safety culture to mature and set it as a main driver
for people, any time, in their daily activities.

1.2.

Problem Statement
Due to the nature of their activities, shipping companies’ organizational

cultures are rarely homogenous or compact. A ship can be owned by a first entity,
operated by a second, and managed by a third entity. Another example is that some
shipping companies are engaging in different shipping activities, e.g., international
voyages versus domestic voyages, and companies operating both cargo ships and
passenger ships. As a result, several organizational subcultures can coexist in the
same organization, and overlap and oppose in some cases. The question that arises
from this statement is as follows: How does the fact of an existence of different
organizational subcultures in the same shipping company affect safety culture?

1.3.

Aim and Objectives
This study intends to contribute to the safety culture improvement of the

shipping industry. It aims specifically to investigate the existence of different
subcultures of safety as a result of an existence of different organizational subcultures
in the same shipping company.
This aim is researched through the use of a case study of international shipping
versus domestic shipping in Algeria. Specifically, the study targeted a shipping
company in Algeria operating both ocean-going and domestic ships with interchanging
crews. In addition, most of the international Conventions, including the STCW
Convention and the ISM Code, are implemented in both types of ships of this shipping
company. This case study with such characteristics may allow to investigate whether
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the same people with the same regulatory setting will have diverse safety cultures, and
therefore behave differently if they are exposed to different organizational cultures.
To achieve the research aim, the study progresses according the following three
objectives:

1. The study looks for identifying the key elements that influence safety
culture within international and domestic shipping activities.
2. The study examines the existence of different subcultures of safety as a
result of the organizational subcultures in the same shipping company.
3. The study intends to investigate the way the shipping company

management of safety can improve safety culture of domestic ships and
align it with the one of the ocean-going ships.
The first and the third research objectives are investigated through two research
questions Q1 and Q2, respectively:
Q1: What are the factors that influence safety within international and domestic
shipping activities and bearing on safety culture?
Q2: In what way does a shipping company safety management contribute to a
difference in safety culture between its different divisions such as for example,
international and domestic shipping divisions?
The second research objective is investigated through validating a hypothesis H1: The
organizational subculture affects safety culture and results in respective subcultures of
safety in the same organization, even with the same employees with the same
qualifications.

1.4.

Composition of the Dissertation

The dissertation consists of five chapters, as described in Figure 1:
● Chapter one contains the background, the problem statement, the aim and
objectives, and the dissertation structure.
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● Chapter two consists of a literature review, focusing mainly on the
organizational culture and safety culture including safety culture in shipping.
● Chapter three discusses the methodology used in this study and explains
detailed processes for the questionnaire survey and the personal interviews.
● Chapter four describes and analyses the results of the questionnaires and
interviews.
● Finally, chapter five discusses the research outcomes. In addition, it provides
conclusions and recommendations for the research study.

Figure 1. Composition of the Dissertation
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2.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1.

Introduction
Developing a positive safety culture has been perceived, in various industries,

as an effective strategy to improve safety. Thus, multiple studies and extensive related
literature have explored distinct factors affecting safety culture directly or indirectly.
Steve, Flin, and Murdey (2007) identified the organization's commitment and
workforce involvement as the only two factors replicated across studies. Indeed, recent
studies, e.g., Li et al., (2021) and Horwitz, (2017) have commonly recognized the
critical role of these two variables in successfully establishing a culture of safety in an
organization. These two variables, besides being critical components of safety culture,
they are intrinsically linked to the organizational culture. However, it is commonly
accepted that organizations rarely have a compact and homogeneous culture, rather,
several subcultures can interact within the same organizations, especially in big and
multinational organizations (Schein, 2010; Antonsen, 2009; Reason, 1997; Schein,
1991). In particular, this fact of different subcultures, as stated by Pidgeon (1998,
p208), might result in divergence in priorities and commitments.
Therefore, this study first compares the safety culture of Algerian maritime
companies engaging in both international and domestic shipping activities. Then, in
line with the relevant research, the study investigates the existence of different
subcultures of safety, e.g., district priorities and commitment toward safety, as a result
of an existence of different organizational subcultures in the same shipping company.
Particularly, the study looks for the way by which the organizational factors, such as
the top management commitment, contribute to creating such safety subcultures, and
consequently influence the shipboard involvement in safety and the overall safety
culture of ocean-going and domestic ships.
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First, the broader theoretical framework of organizational culture and safety
culture will be examined. Then, safety culture in shipping and the related
organizational culture roles will be discussed.

2.2.

Overview of Organizational Culture
Over the last decade, there has been a great deal of literature produced about

the concept of organizational culture. In particular, there has been a great emphasis on
how to successfully undertake organizational changes, which must involve not only
the corporate structures and processes, but also include cultural aspects (Guldenmund,
2010). Therefore, this section will first discuss the "culture" and its link to
organizations.
2.2.1. Culture
Whether we like it or not, everyone is born in a society and develops within a
specific cultural horizon in which people are simultaneously creators and receivers of
culture (Griswold, 2012, p15). According to Alexander et al. (1990, p8), culture and
society are two interdependent concepts; while people are the main component of
society, ideas, behaviors, and material possessions constitute culture. This latter, in
various disciplines, has been an important area of interest.
Although the term "culture" has attracted significant attention, there is no
standard definition of this complex term (Hofstede, 2011). However, researchers have
attempted to establish definitions of the concept differently, resulting in a wide range
of definitions. As postulated by Hinkle and Long (1999), "It may not be an
exaggeration to say that there are nearly as many definitions of culture as there are
fields of inquiry into human societies, groups, systems, behaviors and activities"
(p.01). Schein (1991), for instance, defines culture as "a pattern of shared basic
assumption, invented, discovered, or developed by a given group "(p.318). From
another angle, Kramsch and Widdowson (1998) refer to culture as "a membership in
a discourse community that shares a common social space and history, and common
imaginings" (p.10). Similarly, Cohen (2009) indicated that culture also could be
perceived to refer to ethnicity, nationality, or a set of groups of people sharing specific
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attributes. Although these definitions comprise distinct vocabulary, they commonly
link culture to society members' shared concepts, such as norms, values, and behaviors
obtained and developed in social institutions such as family and school.
Furthermore, there is a common agreement that understanding culture is key
to comprehending how people behave either in the workplace or in their homes
(Cummings & Worley, 2014; Richerson & Boyd, 2008; Hofstede et al., 2005; Holt &
Wigginton, 2002). In the workplace, for instance, it is strongly believed that authority,
leadership, attitudes, and practices emanate from a society's culture (Holt &
Wigginton, 2002). Therefore, for organizations, there is a strong belief that change can
be effectively achieved merely by designing an influential force that could positively
impact people's interests and values with respect to their culture (Thomson & Martin,
2005).
Therefore, for an organization, as stated by Ille and Chailan (2011),
understanding and considering cultural aspects remain strategic factors in strategic
decisions that can be used to operate effectively and competitively, especially in
particular regions with specific cultures. This organization's informal aspect of
performing is described as the organizational culture (Guldenmund, 2010).
2.2.2. Organizational Culture
Three essential components can be identified in organizations and their
activities, namely structure, processes, and culture (Antonsen, 2009; Guldenmund,
2010). The organizational structure is about the formal aspects that determine how an
organization achieves its missions and by whom. It may include infrastructures,
distribution of tasks, and the related responsibilities and authority. The organizational
processes refer to the core business of the organization and the associated processes
that may include management, social and interactional processes, and systems. On the
other hand, the organizational culture, also called corporate culture, is more about the
informal aspect of organizing and executing tasks. It is about what employees in the
organization value or do not value things as necessary (Guldenmund, 2010). This
"informal aspect" of the organizations, as described by Guldenmund (2010), has
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attracted increasing attention over the years, resulting in the extensive published
literature on the topic.
2.2.2.1.

Background and Definition

Most of today's organizational culture literature is traced back to Schein's work
in the early 1980s; however, its first studies are grounded in anthropology and folklore
studies that date back to the 1940s (Alvesson, 2012, p6; Baker, 2002; Hatch, 1993).
Although academic researchers were not quite sure about the meaning of culture, and
even the way to link it to organizations and their business success, there was an
agreement upon the vital role that organizational culture plays in affecting and
reflecting the organization's values and beliefs, and in developing the traits necessary
for a successful business (Siehl & Martin, 1990). In this regard, in creating and
implementing an organization's strategies, Schein (1983), one of the founders of the
organizational culture concept, underlined the importance of cultural matters within
organizations. He stated that "not only does culture limit the strategic options which
are conceivable to an organization, but one cannot implement strategies if they run
against powerful cultural assumptions" (Schein, 1990, p58).
Although this interest in the concept, from the academic standpoint, like the
term "culture", there is no exact and standard definition of the term "organizational
culture". Table 1 reviews, from the literature, some selected definitions of the concept
"Organizational culture".
Table 1. Some Selected Definitions of Organizational Culture in the Literature

Source

Definition of organizational culture

Deal and
Peterson (1999)

"The way we do things around here!".

Holt and
Wigginton
(2002)

The way that organizations promote the values that ensure
cohesive actions between members of the teams
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Hofstede (2011)

"The collective programming of the mind which distinguishes
the members of one organization from another".

Wiegmann et al.
(2004)

The values and beliefs of members of the organization, which are
shared among them in the form of rituals, stories, myths, and
language.

Schein (2010)

"A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as
it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal
integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid
and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way
to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems" (p18).

In comparing and contrasting the definitions of the concept, according to Tharp
(2009), there are three common and shared attributes between the diverse perspectives
of sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, and management scientists. The first is
the concept of shared meaning; the second is the idea that organizational culture is
socially produced and influenced by the environment and history. The third common
attribute among definitions is that organizational culture is deep and exists at all levels
with multiple symbolic and cognitive layers.
The literature also introduces the concept of organizational climate. This
concept began to be used interchangeably by scholars in the 1990's, but recent decade
literature confirmed a distinction between the two organizational concepts (Verbeke
et al., 1998).
2.2.2.2.

Organizational Culture versus Organizational Climate

Organizational culture and climate are different but closely connected and feed
off each other (Ostroff et al., 2013; Schein, 2000). Organizational culture research, as
mentioned above, has its origin in anthropology, while climate is in psychology
(Ostroff et al., 2013). Stolp and Smith (1995, p20) stated that while an organization's
climate describes the people's shared perceptions in their group, culture involves both
the people's feelings and what they believe and value in an organization. Simply stated,
organizational culture refers to "the way we do things around here" in an organization,
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while climate refers to the people's feelings about the organization's environment (Deal
& Peterson, 1999). Both impact individuals' behaviors, but the climate is perceived as
a narrower concept to explain these behaviors than culture because the climate is more
about the immediate environment in organizations. In this regard, Schneider et al.
(2002) associated the organizational climate with the employees' perceptions of their
organization's policies, procedures, and practices. These perceptions have been studied
mainly concerning morality output by associating each climate perception with the
generated behavior from such a perception (Kozlowski & Doherty, 1989). It has also
been discussed that individuals within an organization may perceive things differently,
and consequently, they behave differently. Such behaviors would not necessarily be
consistent with a desired organizational culture.
However, although organizational culture and climate have their roots in
different disciplines and therefore have been approached from different perspectives,
they are both concerned with the psychological aspects of organizations. Both
concepts are based on the shared meanings and understanding of various aspects of the
organizational setting (Ostroff et al., 2013). The two constructs are complementary
and reveal overlapping differences in the phycological life of organizations
(Schneider, 2000). Thus, studying culture and climate jointly is important because the
two constructs together provide a broad context for understanding organizational
behavior. As indicated by Schneider et al. (2011), the attributes associated with both
climate and culture influence individuals and groups in organizations, including job
satisfaction, turnover, safety, and job performance.
Indeed, several scholars have studied the two constructs and have proposed
models to help understand both culture and climate in organizations. In this context,
three cultural models are often used in the literature: Schein's cultural model,
Hofstede's model of cultural dimensions, and Handy’s cultural model. The following
section presents an overview of the two first models (i.e., Schein and Hofstede’s
model).
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2.2.3. Organizational Culture Models
2.2.3.1.

Layers of Organizational Culture- Schein's Model

Schein (1985), referred to as the godfather of the concept of organizational
culture, developed a model that illuminates the existence of three different levels of
culture in any organization simultaneously. To help explain and understand these
layers, Schein (2004) has used the mental image of onion layers to describe
organizational culture, as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2. The Schein Model’s Layers of Organizational Culture
Source: adapted from Schein (1980, 1985)
The external layer comprises artifacts, which are the visible, tangible, and verbally
identifiable components in organizations, such as safety posters, messages,
documentations, safety reports, work procedures, and instructions. The median layer
includes the espoused values and attitudes, which involves the written and verbal
employer's statements and the employees' attitudes regarding safety. At the core of
the organizational culture, there are the basic assumptions. Being implicit and
invisible, but evident for the organization members, the basic assumptions consist of
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the underlying and shared convictions between the organization members. Within
organizations, these basic assumptions
“could be about what is safe and what is not, about workplaces, their hazards,
and housekeeping, about the time spent on safety, about whether certain people
are likely to show risky behavior, about the extent to which people should take
the initiative or await instruction and about whether it is acceptable to correct
other people's unsafe behavior” (Guldenmund, 2010, p 49-50).
Located at the core of the organization's culture, unlike artifacts and espoused
values, the basic assumptions are implicit and invisible; therefore, they cannot be
identified easily and directly; they could, however, be discovered through the
surrounding outer layers (Guldenmund, 2010). That means that the cultural core of
any organization can merely be understood and construed by investigating and
assessing the visible values, attitudes, and artifacts. In fact, it is the inconsistencies
between artifacts and espoused values that disclose the hidden facet of the basic
assumptions (Schein, 2004; Guldenmund, 2010). In line with this statement, Lieven et
al. (2011) indicate that the espoused values in the interference with the related artifacts
may, for instance, stress the leadership, prioritize working safely, open communication
and participation, and promote training, individuals' responsibility and, near-miss
reporting.
2.2.3.2.

Dimensions of Organizational Culture - Hofstede's Model

Geert Hofstede was amongst the first researchers to investigate the impact of
national culture on organizational management practices. Several studies have utilized
the dimensions introduced by this model to explore the differences of national cultures
and their effects on organizational cultures, including the corporate safety culture e.g.,
Okolie and Okoye, (2012) and Noort et al. (2016). To understand the influence of
national culture on organizations, Hofstede (1992) argued that national culture needs
to be categorized in different dimensions. In this respect, Hofstede (1994), based on
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studies conducted, from 1967 to 1973, in a multinational company (i.e., IBMInternational Business Machines), proposed a culture model composed of four
dimensions, namely power distance, collectivism versus individualism, uncertainty
avoidance, and femininity versus masculinity. Later, in cooperation with Michael H.
Bond and Michael Minkov, Hofstede included two additional dimensions: short-term
versus long-term orientation and restraint versus indulgence. Currently, six (6)
cultural dimensions can be identified in Hofstede's model of national culture (Figure
3 refers).

Figure 3. National Culture Dimensions of Hofstede Model
Sources: Corporate Finance Institute (2015)
These includes:
- Large versus small power distance (PDI): The dimension depicts the extent to
which the less powerful members in society or organizations expect and accept the
unequal distribution of power (Hofstede, 2011).
- Individualism versus collectivism (IDV): It shows to what extent the individuals
are integrated into the whole group. It looks, therefore, at cultural aspects like
selfishness, coordination, harmony, and collectivism. Thus, this aspect is extremely
fundamental in building a solid group such as the workplace teams (Hofstede, 2011).
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- Strong versus weak uncertainty avoidance (UAI): This dimension depicts to what
extent a society controls its members to avoid uncertainty. In an avoiding culture, strict
social and behavioral codes, laws, and rules are mainly designed to minimize
ambiguity. There is also a disapproval of deviant opinions and the promotion of full
belief in the one and absolute truth as quoted" 'there can only be one truth, and we have
it "(Hofstede, 2011, p10). However, a society with uncertainty accepting culture is
more tolerant to different and unusual opinions; thus, it tends to have fewer rules
(Furnham et al., 1995; Hofstede, 2011).
-

Masculinity versus femininity (MAS): Masculine or feminine culture does not

refer directly to the dominant gender in society. Instead, it relates to how masculine
traits such as authority and assertiveness are preferred to female characteristics like
the quality of life, personal relationships, and welfare (Jones, 2007).
- Long term versus short term orientation (LTO): The long-term pole involves
values such as perseverance, thrift, arranging relationships according to status, and
having a feeling of shame, while the short-term pole includes respecting tradition,
protecting image, mutual social obligations, and personal stability (Hofstede, 2010).
-

Indulgence versus Restraint (IR): According to Hofstede (2011), an indulgent

society values the satisfaction of its members' needs and desires. It focuses more on
people's happiness, well-being, and leisure time, and freedom and personal control are
more respected. However, restrained society controls and curbs its members'
satisfaction and aligns them with strict societal norms.
Indeed, Hofstede's model has contributed to a better conceptualization and
understanding of organizational culture based on the national culture dimensions
(Obeidat et al., 2012). However, some researchers predicted that the new technological
modernization would likely clear the cultural differences and make societies more and
more similar (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Nonetheless, there is no proof that this will
influence the variety of cultures; it may rather increase differences based on the fact
that "existing value systems in societies cope with technological modernization in
different ways", as stated by Kwork and Tadesse (2006).
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Despite the contribution of these two models in the organizational culture
literature, many researchers criticized them. They blamed the models in their cultural
views to address organizational cultures (Williams et al., 1993). The Hofstede model,
for instance, has been criticized by the fact that the model does not cover cultural
diversity within the national cultures that might not be homogeneous. As stated by
Williams et al. (1993), culture is not entirely homogeneous even in organizations. In
other words, organizations can adopt more than one culture, especially complex
organizations.
2.2.4. Subculture in Organizations and Strength of Organizational Culture
It is commonly accepted that few organizations have compact and homogenous
cultures (Schein, 2010). According to Reason (1997), culture is not a single construct
in an organizational context but a combination and continuous interaction between
multiple organizational subcultures (Antonsen, 2009; Schein 1991)). In practice,
especially for big and multinational organizations, numerous factors can create
subcultures, such as national, regional, sectoral, and professional cultures, political and
economic situations, technology, and regulations. In this regard, Pidgeon (1998) stated
that this fact of different subcultures might result in divergence in priorities and
commitments. That leads, according to Pidgeon, to contradictions, instability, and
inconsistency of values, attitudes, and behaviors among organization employees,
which theoretically leads to negative consequences on safety outcomes. Moreover,
such sub-cultures in one organization can overlap and disagree with each other.
However, Pidgeon (1998) also indicated that different subcultures within an
organization could result in a helpful phenomenon; this may initiate, for instance,
diverse reactions and perspectives in response to unsafe situations.
In sum, it is hard to deny the existence of different subcultures in one single
organization. However, the most important is to ensure coexistence between these
subcultures. The overall organizational culture should absorb the subcultures' negative
and positive influences to build an integrated strong culture (Chatman, 2003).
Furthermore, the organizational culture, whether there are subcultures or not, should
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enable the organization to perform and adapt to new changes (Wahyuningsih et al.,
2019). It must be able to design the behaviors within the organization that lead to its
performance outcomes (Joseph & Kibera, 2019). In addition, organizational culture
should provide a sense of belonging to individuals, contributing to their commitment
toward achieving the organizational goals and objectives and their social stability;
therefore, their behaviors can be effectively shaped and generated positively
(Wiegmann et al., 2004).
However, a number of factors can influence this role of organizational culture.
In practice, corporate culture is influenced by how the company is structured and how
its leaders set it up for success (Abrell-Vogel & Rowold, 2014). Furthermore, making
it a behavioral issue and promoting teamwork and leadership would influence the
culture of any organization (Bratton et al., 2007). National and societal culture is
another factor affecting organizational culture; indeed, how people behave is strongly
linked to society's norms (Buchanan & Huczynski, 2010). Therefore, because of the
influence of many factors, some organizational cultures could be stronger than others.
This power of an organization's culture can be determined, as indicated by Lubis and
Hanum, (2020), by looking into the living of core values by its members and the clarity
of regulation. The more the members accept and live the organization's core values,
the greater the members' commitment contributes to the strength of the organizational
culture and then to the organization's performance.
There are several strengths of organizational cultures. For example, mature
organizational culture is characterized by the stability of its members and their ability
to cooperate and instill deep value (Schein, 2010). A strong culture is another kind of
strength of organizational culture. It refers to the one that supports high ethical
standards (Wahyuningsih et al., 2019) and provides clarity about behavior that must
be adopted and implemented by its members (Purnama, 2013). Moreover, this type of
organizational culture is more consistent in applying the complete set of the
organization's values and beliefs. It is perceived as a powerful medium for
communicating and sharing the desired behavior between members, especially for the
new organization members, as soon as possible through socialization with old
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members. More importantly, it makes people think to achieve common organizational
goals and objectives rather than just individual interests (Shafritz et al., 2015; O'Reilly
et al., 2014).
As a result, several functions and benefits can be drawn from a strong
organizational culture. It gives an organization's members an identity that
differentiates them from other organizations. It increases cooperation and makes the
work environment comfortable. Furthermore, strong culture shapes the desired
behavior by helping the organization members become more aware of their
environment (Lubis & Hanum, 2020).
Although such a strong culture may help ensure members' identity,
commitment, and motivation, it has been argued that the relevance of a strong culture
differs, to some extent, from one organization to another (Baker, 2002). For instance,
a profit-oriented organization is unlikely to focus more on the organizational culture
aspects than the safety-oriented organizations, including nuclear, aviation, and
maritime industries.

2.3.

Overview of Safety Culture
Safety culture is intrinsically linked to the concept of organizational culture

and has attracted interest in a wide range of industries (Donald & Young, 1996;
Choudhry et al., 2007)). Therefore, most of the conceptual definitions of safety culture
have been derived from organizational culture (Cox & Flin, 1998). Furthermore, as
stated by Guldenmund, (2000), safety culture is encapsulated in the organizational
culture's characteristics that influence the individuals' attitudes and behaviors related
to the control and elimination of the hazard.
2.3.1.

Background and Definitions
The concept of 'safety culture' has been first used after the Chernobyl disaster

in 1986 (Mearns & Flin, 1999). The International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group of
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in the investigation report of the
Chernobyl disaster, identified "poor safety culture" as one of the causal factors leading
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to the worst accident of nuclear power plants in history (Mearns & Flin, 1999; Cox &
Flin, 1998). In the following years, in some tragic accidents, such as the King's Cross
underground fire in London in 1987 and the explosion of the oil platform "Piper
Alpha" in 1988, cultural aspects were also pinpointed as contributing factors to the
accidents (Weigmann et al., 2002; Antonsen, 2009). Since then, particularly in highrisk industries, the concept "safety culture" has been largely used in various safety
research, acknowledging, therefore, the importance of the human factor and the soft
aspect of the organization (i.e., cultural part) (Antonsen, 2009).
Similar to the term's "culture" and "organizational culture", although "safety
culture" has been extensively studied for many years, there is no standard definition
of the concept (Guldenmund, 2000; Bisbey et al., 2021). In the first appearance of the
concept, the IAEA defines safety culture as "the assembly of characteristics and
attitudes in organizations and individuals, which establishes that, as an overriding
priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their
significance" (IAEA, 1991, p.1). As Cooper (2000) indicated, this definition stresses
that safety culture is not only related to safety attitudes; instead, it is an important
performance indicator of safety management systems. The definition underlines the
aspect of good management, not only good behaviors.
In the literature, the most cited and used safety culture definition is the one
detailed by the UK Health and Safety Commission (HSC) (Cox & Flin, 1998). It has
endorsed the IAEA's definition of safety culture and provided some characteristics of
a positive safety culture. It defines the safety culture as follows: "the product of
individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of
behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of an
organization's health and safety management" (HSC, 1993, p.23). In line with this
definition, Cox and Cox (1991) define safety culture as "the attitudes, beliefs,
perceptions and the values employees have in common in regards to safety.". The same
view was offered by Pidgeon (1991). He argued that safety culture could be seen as a
constructed system of meanings within a group, by which workers understand the
hazards associated with their work. In sum, although the literature has offered several
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definitions of safety culture, almost all of them encapsulate the shared beliefs, values,
and attitudes by group members. In other words, it is commonly agreed that, at the
individual level, safe or unsafe behaviors are partly driven by the individual's beliefs,
values, and attitudes (Muthuyadav et al., 2015).
In practice, the term "safety culture" refers to how an organization manages
safety and how people share beliefs and attitudes that produce behavior and guide
decision-making (Casey et al., 2017). Thus, two broad elements of safety culture can
be identified. While the first element includes organizational practices, procedures,
and policies to manage safety, the second element covers concepts such as beliefs,
attitudes, values, and norms shared in an organization. In other words, organizational
safety culture is, on the one hand, something that an organization designs to manage
safety, i.e., policies, practices and procedures; on the other hand, it has something that
people share, i.e., attitudes, beliefs, values, and norms. The second element is referred
to in the academic literature as "safety climate" (Neal et al., 2000).
2.3.2. Safety Culture versus Safety Climate
The relationship between the two concepts "safety climate" and "safety
culture" has been exhaustively documented (Guldenmund 2000; Cox and Flin 1998;
Antonsen 2009; Guldenmund, 2010). Originated from a psychological approach
towards safety culture, the term "safety climate" traces back to a study conducted by
Dov Zohar (1980), and since then, several studies and papers have been developed
(Flin et al., 2000; Guldenmund, 2010; Seo et al., 2004).
Although the two terms "safety culture" and "safety climate" have been used
interchangeably, they are not the same (Lieven et al., 2011). Flin et al. (2000) indicated
that safety climate could be viewed as a superficial and transitory snapshot of
organizational safety culture. Simply stated by Cox and Flin (1998), using a metaphor:
safety culture within an organization can be perceived as an organization's personality,
whereas safety climate is an organization's mood. Thus, like organizational culture
versus climate, safety culture is assumed to be a relatively stable construct and resilient
to change in the face of immediate and transient issues than climate (Yule, 2003).
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Regarding the focus of safety climate, Zohar (2010) emphasizes three targets
in any organization of safety climate. It should look first at the way employees
prioritize safety in competing situations. Second, it should correct the gap between
how top management prioritizes safety and how safety is compromised in practice
under operational pressures and demands. Finally, the safety climate should look at
the potential conflicts between how the top management set up policies and procedures
and how these are put in practice at the workplaces and lower organizational levels.
Therefore, as stated by Fogarty and Shaw (2010), the safety climate is one of the
essential dimensions of safety culture and an effective tool to measure safety
performance in organizations.
2.3.3.

Safety culture, Safety Climate, and Safety Performance
The issue of the safety culture approach is to find possible links between the

organization's safety culture and safety performance at both the corporal and lower
levels (Smith & Wadsworth, 2009). However, undoubtedly, enhancing safety culture
amongst workers would positively influence their behaviors, compliance, and
participation in performing their tasks, leading to a higher level of safety in an
organization (Guldenmund, 2010). Thus, Yule and Flin (2007) stated that safety
culture represents an important leading performance indicator that can provide insight
into safety performance and prevent accidents. Similarly, safety climate is considered
and confirmed by many studies as being an important indicator and predictor for safety
performance across industries and can form a basis for a proactive approach toward an
organization's safety performance (Antonsen, 2009; Griffin & Curcuruto, 2016). In
this context, Fang and Wu (2013) stated that a safety climate could be considered as a
measurable tool reflecting organizational safety culture. By analyzing the safety
climate surveys, in fact, it may be possible to identify the relationships between the
different safety culture dimensions within an organization and understand how it can
contribute to the overall outcome of its safety performance (Cooper & Phillips, 2004).
Therefore, it can be concluded that safety climate and culture measurements
are highly correlated and inter-connected (Casey et al., 2017). Thus, for practical
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purposes, the term "safety culture" is used in this research to cover both climate and
culture. This is due to the fact that safety culture is broader than the term safety climate;
furthermore, in the maritime context, the term safety culture is more widely recognized
than safety climate.
2.3.4. Assessing and Improving Safety Culture
Based on the quoted text from Kelvin, "you can't improve what you can't
measure", the continuous measurement of safety management performance is key
(Berg, 2013). In this regard, to determine whether or not change is necessary to
improve management of safety in organizations, safety culture is widely perceived as
an effective predictor and indicator of safety performance (Berge, 2013; Yule & Flin,
2007). Therefore, academic researchers have also extensively studied the topic
associated with safety culture measurement. Several philosophies, forms, and models
of safety culture measurement consequently have been developed. However, the
literature still recognizes that the goals of safety culture assessment still tend to be
more improvement-oriented. As well as there is neither common method of assessing
safety culture across domains or even within a single domain, nor standardized safety
culture dimensions to consider (Cole et al., 2013, p31). Table 2 reviews some surveys
that have been used in the previous safety culture surveys in aviation and shipping
industries and their related dimensions.
Table 2. Some Safety Culture Dimensions Used in Shipping and Aviation Industries.
Source: Adapted from Jung (2021)
Division

Study

Dimensions

Aviation

Wang and Sun
(2012)

Priority- standardizing- flexible- learningteamwork- reporting- just culture.

Song (2014)

Skill- attitude- learning- communication- resource
management- organizational structure- management
of change.
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Shipping

Bhattacharya
(2015)

Safety- organization support- resource availabilitywork environment- job demands- just culture- safety
compliance

ABS (2014)

Communication- empowerment- feedback- mutual
trust- problem identification- promotion of safetyresponsiveness- safety awareness.

In contrasting the surveys, safety culture dimensions differ between industries
and even in the same industry, as stated by Cole et al. (2013, p31). In fact, depending
on the purpose of the research, an appropriate selection of the safety dimensions and
the related indicators is key for the success and failure of the safety culture assessment
(Flin et al., 2000).

2.4.

Overview of Safety Culture in the Maritime Context

2.4.1. Human Factor and Maritime Accidents
In recent years, the shipping industry has witnessed catastrophic accidents,
such as Costa Concordia, Norman Atlantic,and Herald of Free Enterprise. Until to
date, a high number of maritime accidents, including fire, collision, grounding, and
capsize still occur (Baalisampang et al., 2018). According to the AGCS (2019), there
were still 2698 accidents in 2018 globally, which makes the safety of shipping a
persistent thorny issue that needs urgent actions and additional efforts for further
improvement of safety within the sector (Batalden & Sydnes, 2014; Berg, 2013). In
particular, human factor error is still revealed as the first contributor factor in the
majority of catastrophic accidents and is blamed in 80 to 85% of maritime accidents
(Hasanspahić et al., 2021).
However, in looking deeply into the causes of accidents, while major causes of
these accidents were connected to human errors, they were attributable to
organizational factors. Specifically, safety policies, communication, training, incidents
reporting, and learning systems, among others, played an important role in shaping
behaviors and directly or indirectly produced human errors (Lützhöft et al., 2011). As
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stated by Octenal (2011), human error is not an explanation for the cause of accidents
but itself needs further explanation.
2.4.2. ISM Code and Safety Culture in Shipping
In order to improve maritime safety by impacting the way ships are managed
and operated, the IMO has introduced the ISM Code. The ISM Code provides "an
international standard for the safe management and operation of ships". In fact, an
effective application of the ISM Code is assumed to result in a shift from a culture of
unthinking (i.e., compliance) towards a culture of thinking and self-regulation of safety
(i.e., safety culture) (IMO, 2019). Moreover, effective implementation of the ISM
Code should support and encourage the adoption of a proactive approach toward safety
through the development of an appropriate safety culture.
In other words, prioritizing safety - from the top to the bottom - at the
organizational level and on-board ships has been regarded as key to ensure the safe
operations of ships (IMO, 2019). Since then, safety culture has been widely recognized
as one of the most important aspects of maritime safety (Anderson, 2015; Oltedal,
2011). Indeed, the ISM Code provided a regulatory framework to support the
development of such a culture through the establishment of effective Safety
Management Systems (SMSs) by the shipping companies. The implementation of such
SMSs has resulted in a positive impact in promoting safety culture awareness in
shipping, as confirmed by findings of a study conducted by Jung (2021). The study
compared the Korean vessels engaged in international voyages (i.e., ISM Code is
implemented) and domestic Korean vessels (i.e., the ISM code is not implemented).
The findings affirmed a strong correlation between the effectiveness of the ISM Code
implementation and safety culture awareness amongst seafarers.
However, the SMS in many shipping companies has been described as having
a rule-oriented character, resulting in an increasing bureaucracy, and implemented on
a broad basis (Teperi et al., 2019). Thus, as stated by Celik (2009), there is a rising
need for organizational safety policy to support safety culture in shipping
organizations. Specifically, for the SMS in shipping, as a systematic approach to safety
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onboard ships, to overcome the shortcomings and work efficiently, the organizational
culture needs to be at the level where it can support the SMS and enable it to grow and
improve continuously (Grote & Künzler, 2000).
2.4.3.

Organizational and Psychological Factors and Safety Culture In Shipping
As one of the safety-critical organizations, maritime safety management

depends fundamentally on the beliefs and assumptions regarding organizational
behavior and safety of both the management and personnel (Reiman et al., 2015;
Shroff, 2017). In fact, in practice, a ship's safety depends strongly on organizational
and individual interactions and their behaviors and commitment toward safety.
Therefore, any organizational factor that affects seafarers while serving onboard ships
may affect their behaviors and commitments toward safety and, therefore, may deviate
from the entire ship's safety level.
Furthermore, by impacting on the psychological side, the organizational
factors have shown a great influence on the employees' motivation, cognitive
processing, and striving for success and result in a good safety culture level (Nurcholis
& Qurniawati, 2020; Ang-Jun et al., 2018; Cavus & Gokcen, 2015). In addition, based
on the well-known expression "happy ship", it was indicated that crew motivation and
job satisfaction are considered fundamental elements in shipping and affect safety
perceptions (Bergheim et al., 2015). These conditions, as quoted in the literature,
"feeling good and functioning well", refers to psychological well-being and is
described as a critical dimension that influences the safety and efficiency of work
within safety-critical organizations, such as the ship's environment (Alagaraja, 2020;
der Kinderen et al., 2020).
Therefore, it can be seen that the organizational culture in managing safety is
key for the success and failure of safety in shipping. That includes, for instance, the
organizational commitment to safety and its safety prioritization, which may affect the
employees' commitment toward safety (Li et al., 2021; Horwitz, 2017). However, as
discussed in the previous section, organizational culture is not always a homogeneous
and compact culture. Particularly, because of the global nature of shipping, the
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existence of several subcultures in one single maritime company is unlikely to be
avoided. That means different priorities and commitments toward safety can be
identified. Therefore, how do these subcultures affect the overall organizational safety
culture?
2.4.4. Organizational Subcultures and Safety Culture in the Maritime Context
The organizational safety culture literature does not seem to provide a clear
answer about the impact of the existence of different subcultures in one organization.
In addition, it does not provide a clear explanation about the mechanism by which this
fact affects safety and safety culture in organizations. In this concern, Pidgeon and
O'Leary (2000) argued that subculture is not necessarily negative; it may indeed
contribute to" safety blind spots". Similarly, Boisnier and Chatman (2003, p90) stated
that subculture could develop within a single corporate safety culture without
weakening it. On the contrary, other scholars, e.g., Rollenhagen et al. (2013) support
the need for cultural integration in organizations as a way to ensure organizational
reliability and safety.

2.5.

Conclusion
The literature commonly agreed on the importance of safety culture in

achieving the desired safety level in organizations. It furthermore emphasizes the
central and the mediating role of the organizational culture to achieve this goal. The
organizational culture should stand as the umbrella that brings together the
organization's members under common safety goals. However, this will not be
achieved merely through self-commitment toward safety from both managerial and
operational personnel. In particular, organizational management should pay more
attention to their practices, including their safety prioritization and commitment.
Maritime shipping as a global industry is frequently subject to different
management practices. For instance, one shipping company is sometimes operated by
different entities with different management practices, resulting in the unavoidable
existence of different subcultures. Accordingly, each subculture has its own priority
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and commitment. These facts will raise the question: How do these subcultures affect
safety culture in organizations?
The literature does not seem, as mentioned above, to provide a clear answer
about the impact of subcultures on safety culture. This gap indicates the need for the
current research. For this purpose, the study takes a case study of a sipping company,
in Algeria, engaged in both international and domestic shipping activities. By
assessing and comparing safety culture of the two-divisions (i.e., ocean-going and
domestic ships) of the same company, the study investigates the existence of different
subcultures of safety as a result of the fact of differing the organizational cultures. In
particular, the study looks for the way by which the organization commitment toward
prioritizing safety and other organizational factors contribute to creating such safety
subcultures between these two divisions, and consequently influence the shipboard
involvement in safety and the overall safety culture of ocean-going and domestic ships.
The next Chapter provides the methodology employed to conduct the current research.

27

3. CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1.

Introduction
According to Kothari (2004, p8), “A research methodology is a way to

systematically solve the research problem” .The related science provides various
methodologies to conduct research. However, the choice of an appropriate method
depends mainly on the method’s ability to achieve the aim and objectives of the
research (Gray, 2013). In this chapter the proposed methodology for the research is
discussed, including (1) the research strategy, (2) ethical issues, (3) data collection, (4)
data analysis, (5) validity and reliability, and finally, the limitation of this research.

3.2.

Research Strategy
The study investigated the existence of different subcultures of safety as a

result of an existence of different organizational subcultures in the same shipping
company. For this purpose, the research took as a case study of maritime companies,
in Algeria, engaging simultaneously in international and domestic shipping activities.
In particular, these companies apply most of the international Conventions onboard
their domestic ships, especially, the ones related to seafarers’ qualifications (i.e.,
STCW) and safety management, i.e., the ISM Code. However, the organization’s
management of safety between the two shipping divisions were assumed and
demonstrated in the research to be different.
To conduct this research, an “exploratory mixed method” was applied. A
qualitative exploratory survey, consisting of semi-structured personal interviews, was
first conducted to broadly investigate the differences between the two companies’
divisions regarding the shipboard and the companies’ organizational management,
preferences, practices, and attitudes related to safety. This exploratory part, in

28

particular, aimed to identify the critical variables and dimensions of safety culture to
be explored further in the research. Indeed, the study, in addition to the related safety
culture literature has explored the findings of the exploratory survey to help develop a
quantitative safety culture questionnaire. This measurement tool was perceived, first,
to be able to assess safety culture with regard to the selected dimensions, and second,
to be able to underline the factors that make the differences between the two related
organizational cultures in terms of managing safety. Subsequently, the data collected,
either qualitatively and quantitively, served addressing the research aim and
objectives, following the research design path explained in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Research Design – Exploratory Mixed Method
Source: the researcher

3.3.

Ethical Considerations
Ethical considerations were followed in this study due to the involvement of

people as participants in personal interviews and questionnaires. The approval of the
survey questionnaire and interviews required rigorous review by the WMU Research
Ethics Committee to ensure the highest ethical standards adherence. In addition, along
with protecting the participants' rights and privacy, the research considered factors
such as confidentiality, anonymity, data protection, and the ability to withdraw from
the study. Furthermore, the participants' contributions were entirely voluntary, and
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there were no fees associated with their involvement in the study. Finally, no changes
or additions to the received data were made, and all material was deleted after the
submission of the dissertation. The WMU Research Ethics Committee Protocol is
attached in Appendix A: WMU Research Ethics Committee Protocol .

3.4.

Data Collection
The process of collecting data by interviews started on 28 May 2021 and by

survey questionnaire on 25 June. The researcher finalized the data collection by the
end of July. A detailed discussion on the data collection through interviews and
questionnaire survey ensues.
3.4.1. Qualitative Method- Personal Interview
The current study utilized both primary and secondary qualitative sources of
data collection. Primarily sources included semi-structured interviews. Secondary
sources included previous studies conducted in shipping and other industries such as
aviation and nuclear power industry, and included also international publications,
books, and international journals.
The researcher conducted semi-structured interviews to get insights regarding
different aspects associated with safety culture onboard ships engaging in international
and domestic voyages. Participants in these interviews were regarded as experts in the
field by experience; therefore, when given this opportunity to speak freely, they
provided precious information related to the research. The interviews were comprised
of

both

open-ended

and

direct

questions

(See

Appendix

C:

Personal

InterviewsAppendix B : Safety Culture Survey Questionnaire). In addition to the
ethical consideration, the careful and consistent phrasing of questions, and the
selection of experienced interviewees aimed to obtain maximum benefits and
collection of data that may address as appropriate as possible the research questions.
The research interviews involved a careful selection of six relevant
participants, including two Chief Engineers, two Masters, classification society
inspector, and ISM Code auditor (see section 3.4.1). The 4 Chief Engineers and
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Masters have considerable experience in serving in both international and domestic
shipping companies. The two other participants have a seafaring background and
closely work with both international and domestic ships’ seafarers.
After selecting the relevant participants, the research interview process started
by contacting the chosen interviewees via email or phone call to explain the purpose
of the research and ask for their participation in the study. Those who accepted to
contribute were provided further aspects regarding the investigation and ethical issues
and subsequently, the interview date was agreed on. The interviews were conducted
in French and Arabic, which are the two spoken languages in Algeria and then
translated by the researcher to English.

Figure 5. Composition of the Study Interviews’ Sample
Source: Researcher
3.4.2. Quantitative Method - Survey Questionnaire
In this part, the study uses only a primary source, consisting of a quantitative
survey questionnaire. The survey targeted Algerian seafarers working on board ships
belonging to shipping companies operating both ocean-going and domestic ships
However, because of the difficulty to directly target the sample of the interest by an
online survey, the questionnaire was first distributed to the whole seafaring population
in Algeria. Then, the researcher filtered the targeted sample in the data analysis process
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using the background information. Accordingly, the survey population consisted of
four samples (see Figure 6):
-

Sample A: Seafarers employed by shipping companies operating only oceangoing ships.

-

Sample B1: Seafarers working onboard ocean-going ships belonging to
shipping companies operating both of domestic and ocean-going ships.

-

Sample B2: Seafarers working onboard domestic ships belonging to shipping
companies operating both of domestic and ocean-going ships.

-

Sample C: Seafarers employed by shipping companies operating only domestic
ships.

Figure 6. The Targeted Samples of Seafarers by the Survey Questionnaire
Source: Researcher
The questionnaire was developed based on: (1) the literature review and
previous studies in shipping and other industries; and (2) the initial exploratory study.
In fact, in developing this questionnaire, items from previous surveys as well as new
ones were used. Items selected from previously validated questionnaires were
rephrased in such a way all seafarers, whatever their ranks, can understand their
meaning. The study selected some items that were previously used in different studies
and standardized surveys, such as: Safety Climate questionnaire -NOSCQ-50; Safety
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attitudes questionnaire-SAQ; Zohar (2000, 2003); and the Safety Culture
Questionnaire used in a study conducted by (Oltedal, 2011). The first draft of the
survey questionnaire consisted of 94 items covering several aspects of safety culture
on board ships. With the help of the exploratory study analysis, the researcher reduced
the number of items, where some were removed, and new ones were added. The final
draft of the questionnaire was composed of 46 items belonging to six (3) main sections
in addition to the background information section (Appendix B : Safety Culture Survey
Questionnairefers).
The questionnaire was developed and administered to quantitively collect data
from seafarers. It was designed to collect perceptions regarding different aspects
related to safety culture. Thus, the questionnaire consisted of a collection of
statements, e.g., “Minor incidents are not reported in writing on my vessel.”, which
required the participants to answer by giving their agreement according to a Likert
scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. In the pilot survey, a 7point Likert scale was used (Strongly disagree- Disagree- Slightly agree - AgreeNeutral-Agree-Slightly agree- Strongly agree). Based on the pilot study feedbacks, and
given that the questionnaire used an online software, the researcher shortened the
length of question phrases. The Likert scale length was also reduced to 5 points (i.e.,
Strongly disagree- Disagree- Neutral- Agree- Strongly agree).
The original version of the questionnaire was in English. After receiving
approval from the WMU Research Ethics Committee, the questionnaire was translated
from English to French and Arabic. A forward-backwards translation method was used
to avoid any significant divergence in the meaning of items between the three
languages. The translation was performed by independent translators from Algeria and
France, with knowledge of English, and French and/ or Arabic. The final two
questionnaires (i.e., Arabic and French questionnaire versions) were compared to the
original version by the researcher and an English professor in Algeria.

3.5.

Data Analysis
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The primary purpose of the personal interviews phase was to serve as an
exploratory survey. It was intended to help build the questionnaire sections, develop
hypotheses, and assist in the discussion part. The research interviews to meet the
assigned role was guided by two research questions:
RQ1: What are the key elements that differentiate safety culture between international
and domestic shipping?
RQ2: In what way does a shipping company management contribute to a difference in
safety culture between its ships’ divisions of international and domestic shipping
activities?
The interview data were analyzed using content analysis and manual coding.
The data collected by the quantitative questionnaire was analyzed using SPSS.

3.6.

Reliability and validity
The mixed-method used in this research provided deep insights and

information regarding the aim and the objectives of the research. The semi-structured
interview questions were prepared carefully concerning both content and structure and
were validated by a professor with extensive experience and knowledge in the
maritime sector.
For the quantitative part, owing to the fact that the questionnaire composition
was a mix of old and new items which no previous study had examined for their
reliability or validity, the reliability and validity evaluation of the questionnaire was
performed in the data analysis. Furthermore, the inclusion of relevant stakeholders for
the study such as classification society inspector, ISM Code auditor, Chief Engineers
and Masters, as well as a large number of seafarers (a total number of 549 seafarers)
lead to achieving a valid and reliable research outcome.

3.7.

Limitations
There are numerous aspects and indicators for assessing safety culture.

However, for the research objectives and the limitation of the allocated time, many
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elements were omitted, such as employees’ empowerment, leadership empowerment,
and reward system.

The seafarers targeted by the questionnaire survey who meet the core interest
of the study were only from Algeria; the findings can be said, therefore, not entirely
representing the viewpoints of the worldwide maritime population.
Last and not least, this safety culture questionnaire, as a tool of assessment,
was based on collecting self-reported perceptions, opinions, beliefs, feelings and
practices. Unfortunately, such self-reporting can deviate from reality. Therefore,
additional instruments to correct this deviation and examine what is in place may be
necessary, including audits and local observations.
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4. CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS
The previous chapters provided the theoretical framework and the suggested
methodology to conduct the research. This chapter will discuss the results of the data
analysis. The first section consists of the qualitative data analysis, and the second
section will analyze the quantitative data.

4.1.

Qualitative Data Analysis
The qualitative survey was primary intended to explore the topic of interest

and help developing the measurement tool and formulate possible hypotheses. Seven
interviews with maritime experts, as described in section 3.4.1, were conducted and
garnered in depth information regarding the key differences between ocean-going and
domestic ships in various aspects related to safety culture. Each recorded interview
took an approximative time between 45 to 60 minutes. Then, the researcher analyzed
the interviews findings by categorizing the data and identifying themes, which assisted
in developing the measurement tool and one main hypothesis.
4.1.1. Analysis of the Interviews
According to Creswell (2009), qualitative data analysis consists of several
steps. Transcribing the interviews was the first step. It was followed by reading the
transcripts many times along with listening to the recordings to ensure the accuracy of
the transcription and all the information given by participants were correctly captured.
In particular, the interviews transcripts were organized in sections to help categorizing
data. The transcripts were, then, provided to the participant to check and give their
final approval. The second step was categorizing the data. As indicated by Creswell
and Plano-Clark (2007), “categorizing is the process of grouping evidence and labeling
ideas so that they reflect increasingly broader perspectives” (p.123). The third step was
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developing themes based on the categories proposed. In fact, this step relies also on
reading the transcripts many times to identify interview themes. The last step in
analyzing the interviews was interpreting the data through the examination of the
categories and labeling the interview themes.
4.1.2. Qualitative Results
The samples of the interviewees, as described in section 3.4.1, were carefully
selected to provide as much as possible relevant information, relative to safety culture
onboard ocean-going versus domestic ships. The selected 2 Masters and 2 Chief
engineers have an abundant experience in working onboard both types of ships in their
company. In addition, an ISM Code auditor and a classification society inspector were
also selected based on the fact that they closely work with these two types of ships and
their crew. In total, six interviews were conducted and then analyzed. The researcher
identified four (4) categories, including fourteen (16) themes related to the topic of
interest. The four categories are: the organizational safety management, shipboard
safety climate, job satisfaction, and pressure and stress on board ships. The description
of the three categories and their associated themes are as follows:
Category 1: Organizational safety Management
This category arose from interviewees discussing how the organization
manages safety of their ocean-going and domestic ships. Two themes were extracted
from this category: (1) prioritizing safety over commercial operation and (2) proactive
approach in improving safety. This second theme relates to how the shore side in the
company collaborates with the shipboard and provides support to improve safety
before accidents occur.
Category 2: Shipboard safety climate
This category involved 11 themes relative to the environment and the working
conditions onboard ships that positively or negatively impact safety. The ten themes
are: (1) effectiveness of the SMS’s procedures, (2) adequacy of safety training, (3)
adequacy of documentation, (4) adequacy of safe manning level, (5) Master and
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immediate superiors’ prioritization of safety, (6) teamwork environment, (7) safety
communication, (8) reporting system, (9) tradeoff between work efficiency and safety,
(10) fatigue, and (11) crew safety behavior.
Category 4: Job Satisfaction
This category involved one theme: Crew Job Satisfaction. It referred to what
extent seafarers are satisfied with their job, salary, career, company and the working
conditions on board ships. This latter, crew job satisfaction, was considered as an
influential element on safety culture in this study, based on previous studies in various
domain such as the health care. In fact, in this latter, it occupies a whole section in the
related Safety Attitude Questionnaire (SAQ) that was used to assess safety culture.
Category 3: Pressure and Stress on Board Ships
This category involved two themes consisting of (1) external safety
supervision, and (1) other stressors on board ships. The external safety supervisions
referred to in the interviews were related to port and flag State controls, external audits
and other safety inspections carried out by external entities. the other stressors
involved different factors that introduces stress to seafarers such as working
conditions, health issues, and the seafaring job itself.
4.1.3. Development of Main Hypothesis
Based on the interviews analysis, it can be witnessed that there was common
agreement that safety culture of ocean-going and domestic ships belonging to the same
company and operating by interchanging crews is different in many aspects. In other
words, the same seafarers under the same regulations behave differently when exposed
to different organizational management of safety. Therefore, to felicitate addressing
the research aim, a hypothesis H1 was formulated as follows:
Hypothesis (H1): “The organizational subculture affects safety culture and results in
respective subcultures of safety in the same organization, even with the same
employees with the same qualifications.”
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Further in the hypothesis testing, hypothesis H1 was broken-down to height
sub-hypotheses for statistical reasons (see section 4.3.3).
4.1.4. Development of the Survey Questionnaire
As mentioned above, the qualitative part of the mixed method provided
exploratory data. In particular, the data helped in constructing the study safety culture
measurement tool. Based on the detail of the themes, several aspects connected to
safety culture to be assessed by the questionnaire were first suggested, among others
communication, safety prioritization, documentation, training, safety participation,
safety compliance, safety and management system. Then, by exploiting previous
safety culture assessment studies, some suggested aspects were found replicated in
different studies’ measurement tools, among others the Safety Aattitudes
Questionnaire (SAQ), The Nordic Occupational Safety Climate Questionnaire
(NOSCQ-50), and a study conducted in shipping by Oltedal (2011). Therefore, to
preserve the psychometric priorities of the questionnaire’s items, these replicated items
were taken and adapted to the maritime context. Finally, a safety culture survey
questionnaire was constructed with the aim to assess safety culture and disclose
differences between ocean-going and domestic ships. In the quantitative data analysis,
the questionnaire validity and reliability were assessed. Appendix D: The Construction
of the Survey Questionnaire presents the questionnaire’ items and their link to the
interviews analysis’ themes.

4.2.

Quantitative Data Analysis
The quantitative data analysis consists of two parts. The first part was the

preliminary analysis, including data collection and preparation for analysis,
demographic characteristics, and reliability and validity. The second part of the
analysis analyzed the results and the tested the different hypotheses. In particular,
when analyzing data, this section is following the order of the research objectives and
their related statistical methods, as presented in Figure 7.
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Figure 7. The Statistical Methods Utilized in the Quantitative Data analysis
Source: researcher
4.2.1. Data Collection and Preparation for Analysis
The survey study was conducted in Algeria from June 25 to July 24. Both the
paper- and- pen and the online options were utilized to distribute the questionnaire
amongst seafarers. In this quantitative survey, 549 completed questionnaires were
collected. Excluding questionnaires with unanswered items, the questionnaires of 418
were initially considered valid for the analysis. However, the initial descriptive
analysis using the online data collection software showed some issues. For example,
some participants responded randomly to all the questions using only one or two
options (e.g., “Neutral/Agree”). Therefore, a filter using a time spent to answer the
survey questionnaire was applied to ensure that the respondents had read the questions
(i.e., time less than 5 minutes was considered insufficient to read and answer all the
survey questions). After isolating the invalid questionnaires, the questionnaires of the
remaining 373 respondents were assumed to be valid and utilized for the analysis,
representing 67.9% of the total collected questionnaires.
The collected data was prepared for statistical analysis by coding them into
SPSS 26.0 file. Responses to items containing negatively worded statements were
reversed and re-coded; thus, higher recorded scores reflect a positive safety culture.
As mentioned above, the questionnaires were collected from seafarers in Algeria,
whatever their companies were; then, a new independent variable was computed using
respondents’ background information, separating the respondents into four samples,
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including the research targeted two samples, as described in section 3.4.2. Finally,
different descriptive analyses were performed using the SPSS to ensure that all the
data were entered correctly and extracted respondents’ demographic characteristics.
4.2.2. Respondents Demographic Data
The 373 respondents were distributed on four samples, as discussed in the
methodology chapter (see section 3.4.2 ). First, the ocean-going ships’ sample (A)
included 82 respondents, representing 22%. Second, the ocean-going ships’ sample
(B1) included 117 respondents, representing 31.4%. Third, the domestic ships’ sample
(B2) included 89 respondents (23.9%). Finally, the domestic ships’ sample (C)
included 85 respondents, representing 22.8%. The details of the samples’ respondents
are given in Table 3.
Table 3. General Characteristics of Participants
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The personal profiles of respondents showed essential and relevant
characteristics. The female gender represented 7.5% of the survey’s respondents.
However, in the research targeted samples (i.e., B1 and B2), females represented 9%
in sample B1 and 14% in sample B2. Officers from both deck and machine
departments represented 78.8% of the survey’s respondents. Furthermore, 59% were
under 35 years regarding the respondents' age, while only 7% were above 55 years.
The distribution also shows that 65.6% of respondents had more than five years of
seafaring experience. In particular, from this experienced seafarer’s category, 35.4%
of them had more than ten years, reflecting abundant experience in every single sample
of the participants. Last and not least, in all the samples, around 60 to 65% of
respondents had permanent contact with their employers.
In summary, the survey participation resulted in a balanced distribution in the
number of participants between the samples. Furthermore, the participants’ profile
shows meaningful characteristics such as age group of 25-35 years, the rank of
officers, and the experience of more than 5 years. Therefore, in addition to the
representative character of the study samples, the survey respondents appear to be the
current and the future leaders of shipping in Algeria. This fact is likely to add more
relevance and importance to the conducted study.
4.2.3. Validity and Reliability
4.2.3.1.

Exploratory Factor Analysis

A survey questionnaire intends to obtain relevant information from the
respondents most reliably and validly (Taherdoost, 2016). Thus, the validity and
reliability of the measurement tool are considered essential for any study when
designing questionnaires and performing statistical analyses. Accordingly, validity
analysis is necessary for the research to confirm the accuracy of the survey
measurement tool in measuring what is supposed to be measured, and therefore
covering the actual investigation area. Reliability analysis, on the other hand,
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demonstrates the consistency of the survey tool. It indicates the extent to which the
questions asked in a survey extract the same information each time they are asked
different respondents (Taherdoost, 2016; Field, 2005). Therefore, a reliability analysis
is the first step in the process of validating a measurement tool. If the measurement
tool is not reliable, indeed, it cannot be valid.
Therefore, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA)1, using SPSS 26, was first
performed in this data analysis. In this study, the survey questionnaire comprised
various questions (i.e., items) connected to several aspects that were identified to be
linked to the topic of interest and achieve the research aim and objectives. Then,
exploratory factor analysis was performed to explore and define the underlying factors
and structure the dataset. However, before conducting such an analysis, first, the
Bartlett test of sphericity2 and Kaiser-Mayer Olkin (KMO) test3 were performed to
examine the data suitability to conduct an exploratory factor analysis (Song, 2015).
The obtained values for both tests were satisfactory (i.e., more than 0.8 for KMO’s test
and less than 0.01 for the Bartlett test of sphericity), as shown in Table 4.
Table 4. KMO and Bartlett Tests Result for Sampling Adequacy

Using SPSS’s component extraction and Varimax rotation, and considering the
following criteria: (1) Pairwise deletion; (2) Eigenvalue more than 1.0; and (3) at least
three items in the factor with minimum loading of 0.5 (Field, 2005). The exploratory
factor analysis resulted in the extraction of 8 factors, cumulating 65.692 of the total

1

Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) is a technique to identify the cluster of variables. It helps to
understand the dataset's structure, construct the questionnaire to measure an underlying variable, and
reduce the dataset to a more manageable size (Field, 2005).
2
Bartlett test of Sphericity compares a correlation matrix to check if there is redundancy between
variables that can be categorized with a few numbers of factors.
3
A Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test is used to determine the adequacy of the data sample for
performing Factor Analysis.
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variances. The items based on their relationships and intercorrelations were
categorized together (i.e., factors) and named as shown in Table 5. In fact, the eight
extracted factors, representing different aspect related to the safety culture onboard
ships, were named as follows: (Factor name in italic):
Factor 1: Top Management4 Commitment, reflecting the crew perception of the
commitment of the shore-side of the organization towards prioritizing and proactively
improving the onboard safety
Factor 2: Safety Management System, reflecting the crew perception of the
management safety practices and resources (i.e., other than human resources) devoted
to improving shipboard’s safety, such as the adequate documentation, new members’
safety familiarization, sharing safety information, and the supporting rules and
procedures.
Factor 3: Safety- related Human Resource, reflects the perceived adequate safety
manning, regarding crew size and its training to handle safety on board.
Factor 4: Local Management5 Involvement, reflects the crew perception of the
involvement of the Master and their immediate superiors in prioritizing safety and
applying the safety rules, including punishment for violating rules, contributing to the
reporting system, and organizing the workload to not impede safety procedures.
Factor 5: Crew Psychological Safety, reflects the crew cohesion, its communication
openness, the team shared trust, and the resulted team climate that motivates
individuals to ask for help, report their mistakes without fear of blame, and voluntary
participation in safety improvement.

4

Top management in this research refers to the shore-side of the shipping company responsible for
ships’ management including safety management.
5
Local management refers in the research to the machine and deck senior and junior officers on board
ships.
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Factor 6: Crew6 Safety Behavior, reflects the crew reported safety attitudes and
practices, including their compliance with the safety rules and their voluntary
participation in activities that improve safety on board.
Factor 7: Crew Job Satisfaction, reflects the seafarer’s perception about their
satisfaction regarding belonging to the company, seafaring job, salary and career
promotion, and the working conditions on board.
Factor 8: External Supervision Pressure, reflects the seafarers’ recognition of stress
and pressure introduced by the external supervisions carried out on board ships,
including port and flag State controls and other safety inspections and audits.
Factor 1, 2, and 3 were considered as organizational factors. While factors 4,
5, 6, and 7 were considered shipboard safety culture factors, factor 8 represented an
external factor.
4.2.3.2.

Reliability and Validity Test

The Cronbach alpha value was used to estimate the internal consistency
between the combined items in the same factor for the scale's reliability. As a rule of
thumb, the following criteria were applied: (1) a minimum of the alpha value of 0.7;
(2) item-total correlation more than 0.4; and (3) inter-item correlation more than 0.30
and less than 0.80 (Field, 2005; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2000). In total, between the
factor analysis and the reliability test steps, nine items were considered less reliable.
Therefore, they were removed (i.e., seven items were removed in the exploratory
factor analysis step and two items due to their failure in the reliability test). The final
test confirmed that all factors and their items satisfied the reliability conditions.
Therefore, the obtained Cronbach alpha value of the overall 37 items’ questionnaire
was 0.921, and those for the listed factors were more than 0.7 each. Also, the rule for
minimum loading of items was respected, as shown in Table 5.

6

In this research, the terms “crew” and “seafarers” were utilized interchangeably.
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Table 5: Results of The Exploratory Factor Analysis and Reliability Test

4.2.4. Normality Test
The statistical analyses might require the utilization of various tests. The choice
of an adequate test depends on the nature of the distribution of data. Thus, the literature
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provides several methods and tests to check the normal distribution of data, such as
graphical assessment of normality, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, Shapiro-Wilk test,
Lilliefors corrected K-S test, D’Agostino skewness test, and Jarque-Bera test
(Ghasemi & Zahediasl, 2012). Among these tests, the Kolmogorov Smirnov test
appears to be very popular, and the rule of thumb is a p-value greater than 0.05
(Ghasemi & Zahediasl, 2012; Thode, 2002). Therefore, in this research, in addition to
visual observations, the Kolmogorov Smirnov test for independent samples, using
SPSS, was performed to test the null hypothesis that the data follows from a normal
distribution. The SPSS’s computed results indicated that there were no significant
violations of normality. Therefore, parametric, rather than non-parametric tests, were
used in the following data analysis.

4.3.

Analysis of the Survey Data
The researcher analyzed the survey questionnaire data in such a way the

findings can address the research objectives, as described in Figure 7.
The first research objective was to identify the key safety culture elements that
influence safety culture on board ocean-going and domestic ships. The exploratory
factor analysis resulted in extracting eight safety culture factors. Then, as a second
step, a correlation analysis was performed to examine the degree of correlation (i.e.,
impact) of the safety culture factors, and therefore, identifying the most influential
factors on safety culture.
4.3.1. Correlation Analysis of Safety Culture Factors
Bivariate correlation analysis was conducted using the SPSS tool to examine
the associations amongst the eight safety culture factors. All the data collected from
the 373 seafarers, including samples A, B1, B2, and C, was used in this analysis.
In interpreting the analysis results, the closer the value of Pearson Correlation
Coefficient to ±1, the higher the correlation, and the closer the value to 0, the lower
the factors’ correlation (Field, 2005). Table 6 presents the correlation analysis result

47

Table 6. Results of the Correlation Analysis of Safety Culture Factors.

The correlation analysis between the overall safety culture (SC) and its factors
showed that the lowest correlation was with external supervision pressure (ESP).
However, the highest correlations were with crew safety behavior and local
management involvement at .812 and .805, respectively. The other six factors ranged
between .652 and .770, reflecting high correlation with the overall safety culture too.
Additionally, by comparing the correlation of the eight safety culture factors inter se,
the analysis results showed no significant correlation between the external supervision
pressure (ESP) and all the remaining seven factors. However, the reported crew safety
behavior was highly correlated with the perceived local management involvement
(LMI) and safety management system (SMS) effectiveness, recording .731 and .655,
respectively. Local management involvement (LMI) also had a high correlation with
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the perceived crew psychological safety (CPS). Figure 8 and Figure 9 recapitulate
the correlation analysis results.

Figure 8. Correlation between Safety Culture and its Factor

Figure 9. Correlation between the Safety Culture Factors.
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To conclude, the correlation analysis provided the research an overview
regarding the degree to which the factors affect the overall safety culture score. In
particular, the analysis showed marginal influence of the external safety supervisions
on safety culture. In contrast, the remaining seven safety culture factors were highly
correlated with the overall safety culture, leading the researcher to consider the
aforementioned seven factors as key elements that influence safety culture of both
ocean-going and domestic ships.
The second research objective aimed to investigate the influence of differing the
organizational culture related to safety, in the same shipping company, on safety
culture. To achieve this objective, the study conducted a comparative analysis of safety
culture factors between ocean-going and domestic ships, followed by a hypothesis
testing.
4.3.2. Comparative Analysis of Safety Culture Factors.
The study first compared the eight safety culture factors between the two
samples of respondents belonging to the same company, as described in section 3.4.2,
namely: (1) Ocean-Going ships (Sample B1); (2) Domestic ships (Sample B2).
The results of the comparative analysis are summarized in Table 7, Figure 10, and
Figure 11.
Table 7. Comparison of Safety Culture Factors’ Scores between Ocean-Going and
Domestic Ships of the Same Company with Interchanging Crews.
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Figure 10. Comparison of Means’ Value of Safety Culture Factors between OceanGoing and Domestic Ships of the Same Company with Interchanging Crews.

Figure 11. Differences of Means of Safety Culture Factors between Ocean-Going
and Domestic ships of the Same Company with Interchanging Crews.
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According to Table 7 and the radar plot graph in Figure 10, it can be seen that
there are noticeable differences of the mean value in each safety culture factor between
ocean-going and domestic ships of the same company with interchanging crews. The
mean values of organizational commitment toward safety were 3.58 and 2.87 for
ocean-going and domestic ships, respectively. The mean values of the safety
management system were 3.85 and 3.33 for ocean-going and domestic ships,
respectively. The crew safety behavior followed the same trend, recording 2.85 and
3.31 for ocean-going and domestic ships, respectively.
However, according to Figure 11, the mean differences of the eight safety
culture factors between ocean-going and domestic ships are not stable. The top
management commitment had the highest mean difference of 0.71. In contrast, the
safety management system, human resource for safety, crew safety behavior, and crew
job satisfaction recorded almost the same mean difference, between 0.52 and 0.55. The
crew psychological safety and the external supervision pressure had the lowest
differences, recording 0.12 and 0.20, respectively.
Although the results showed apparent, but unbalanced, differences in the safety
culture factors scores between ocean-going and domestic ships, statistically, it cannot
be said that there are significant differences. Further statistical analysis is needed to
verify the hypothesis H1, and therefore to address the research objective.
4.3.3. Hypothesis Testing- Hypothesis H1
This section intended to verify hypothesis H1, developed in the qualitative data
analysis (see section 4.1.3). To achieve this goal, eight sub-hypotheses were
established (see Table 9). Accordingly, an independent t-test was performed to
determine whether there is statistical evidence that mean value of each factor of the
associated samples are significantly different. A “p-value” less than 0.05 and an
absolute value of t-test more than one were considered conditions to support
hypotheses. However, statistically, the calculation methods of the independent sample
t-test rely on the degree of homogeneity of variance between the two compared
samples (Rasch et al., 2011). Therefore, SPSS, when running an independent sample
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t-test, systematically runs a test called Levene's Test for the homogeneity of variance.
In this analysis, the assumption of “equal variance assumed” was violated for all the
safety culture factors (i.e., the related p-value of Levene’s test is more than 0.05). Thus,
the comparative analysis considered the t and p values that correspond to the case of
“equal variance not assumed”. Table 8 displays the results of the t-Test.
Table 8. Result of the t-test for Comparing Safety Culture Factors Between
B1(Ocean-Going ships) and B2(Domestic ships).

According to the results analysis, it can be concluded that H1.1, H1.2, H1.3,
H1.4, H1.6, and H1.7 were supported, whereas H1.5 and H1.8 were rejected, as
summarized in Table 9. The results showed no significant differences (i.e., pvalue>0.05) in the perceived pressure caused by external supervision (H1.8) and in the
perceived crew psychological safety (H1.5) between ocean-going and domestic ships’
crews. On the other hand, there were significant differences (t> one and p-value<0.05)
between ocean-going and domestic ships in the perceived top management
commitment (H1.1); the safety management system effectiveness (H1.2); safety
related human sources (H1.3); the local management involvement (H1.4); the reported
crew safety behavior (H1.6); and in the perceived crew job satisfaction (H1.7).
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Table 9. Results of the Research Hypothesis (H1) Testing.
No.

Hypothesis Description

t-Test
results

H1.1 In the same company, the perceived top management Supported
commitment toward improving ocean-going ships' safety
significantly differs from domestic ships.
H1.2 In the same company, the perceived effectiveness of the safety Supported
management system of ocean-going ships significantly differs
from that of domestic ships.
H1.3 In the same company, the perceived adequacy and qualification Supported
of human resources devoted to the ocean-going ships
significantly differ from domestic ships.
H1.4 In the same company, the perceived involvement of local Supported
management of ocean-going ships in safety significantly differs
from that of domestic ships.
H1.5 In the same company, the perceived phycological safety of Rejected
ocean-going crew differs from that of domestic ships.
H1.6 The reported safety behavior of ocean-going ships’ crew differs Supported
from that of domestic ships’ crew.
H1.7 In the same company, the perceived job satisfaction of ocean- Supported
going crew significantly differs from that of domestic ships’
crew.
H1.8 In the same company, the perceived pressure caused by external Rejected
supervisions of ocean-going crew significantly differs from that
of domestic ships’ crew.
It can be concluded that the research support to a large extent (75%) the main
hypothesis (H1) that: “the organizational culture affects safety culture and results in
safety subcultures in the same organization, even with the same employees with the
same qualifications”.
Finally, the third research objective aimed to investigate the way the
organizational factors affect safety culture on board ships. Previously, correlation
analysis confirmed a likelihood of identifying significant effects of some factors on
others. However, correlation analysis lacks the ability to predict the direction of effects
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between factors, as well as to explain how combination of a number of factors would
affect a third factor. This limitation can be overcome by regression analysis. As stated
by Archdeacon (1994, p.238), “regression coefficients naturally yield more
information than correlations about the relationship between variables”.
4.3.4. Regression Analysis of Safety Culture Factors
Regression is the most widely used statistical analysis, which provides a
complete coverage of the statistical methods of statistical analyses that enable
discovering the relationship between variables (Freund et al., 2006; Draper & Smith,
1998). In this study, regression analysis was used to discover the relationship between
the safety culture factors, and therefore to address the third research objective. The
correlation analysis showed a weak correlation of external supervision pressure (ESP)
to the other factors. Thus, in the regression analysis, the study considered seven
dependent factors by excluding this factor (i.e., ESP), but this latter was considered
with the independent factors in each regression. In total, seven separated regression
analyses were performed; each regression took one safety culture factor as dependent
variable and regressed it on the others. The results of the organizational factors and the
shipboard safety climate factors are presented in Table 10 and Table 11, respectively.
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Table 10. Results of the Linear Regression of Safety Culture Factors- Part 1
(Organizational factors)

According to the linear regression analysis of the organizational safety culture factors,
there were significant evidence (p-value<.05) that:
-

The crew members perception of their local management involvement in safety
affects their perception regarding the adequacy of the safety related human
resources.

-

The crew members’ safety behavior, job satisfaction, and perception regarding
the effectiveness of safety management system affect their perception
regarding the top management commitment toward safety.

-

The crew members’ safety behavior and perception regarding the top
management commitment toward safety affect their perception regarding the
effectiveness of safety management system.
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Table 11. Results of the Linear Regression of Safety Culture Factors- Part 2
(Shipboard’ safety climate factors)

According to the linear regression analysis of the shipboard’s safety climate factors,
there were significant evidence (p-value<.05) that:
-

The crew members’ job satisfaction and perceptions regarding local
management involvement, effectiveness of safety management system and top
management commitment affect their safety behavior.

-

The crew members’ safety behavior, and their perceptions regarding
psychological safety on board and the top management commitment influence
their job satisfaction.
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-

The crew members’ job satisfaction and the perceived local management
involvement affect the crew perception regarding psychological safety on
board.

-

The crew members’ safety behavior, and their perceived shipboard
psychological safety and adequacy of human resources influence their
perception of the local management involvement in safety.
To conclude, the linear regression analysis yielded abundant information

regarding the relationship between the safety culture factors. However, here, the
predicted effects are linear and cannot explain, for instance, the interaction between
two factors that affect the third factor, which exists in practice. Therefore, to properly
address this research objective, there was a need for a further regression analysis,
called “moderated regression analysis”, aiming to collect more information regarding
the relationship between the safety culture factors.
4.3.5. Moderated Regression Analysis of Safety Culture Factors
4.3.5.1.

Moderated Regression Analysis Method

In statistics, moderated regression analysis is frequently used to test whether a
third variable affects the relationship between the dependent and independent variables
(Tharenou et al., 2007). This third variable is called a moderator, which affects the
direction and the strength of the relation between the dependent and independent
variables (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2000). Thus, in the moderator model, three paths
may lead to the dependent variable (Baron and Kenny, 1986):
-

The way the independent variable (x) impacts the dependent variable (y);

-

The way the moderator variable (m) affects the dependent variable (y); and

-

The interaction of the moderator variable and the independent variable (m.x) that
impacts the dependent variable (y).
In addition, to avoid multicollinearity, Baron and Kenny (1986) suggested that the

moderator and the independent variables need to be centered. Also, they postulated, in
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the regression model, that the variable (y) is a linear function of the variable (x), and
the interaction (x.m), as shown in (1):
y = 0 + 1.x + 2.m + 3.x.m +

(1)

The intercept 0 and the slopes 1, 2, and 3 are unknown coefficients and  is a
random error constant.
To facilitate the interpretation of the results, Cohen et al. (2003) suggest
plotting the regression of y on x on three values of m (i.e., the mean of m, the low
value, and the high value of m); in fact, the low and high values of m can be one
standard deviation below the mean (i.e., low value) and one above the mean (i.e., high
value). As a result, three plotted lines for the regression of y on x at three values of m
can be compared with each other.
4.3.5.2.

Moderated Regression Analysis Results

This analysis intended to investigate how the organizational factors can
moderate the impact of the shipboard’s safety climate factors (CJS, CPS, and LMI) on
the crew safety behavior (CSB). Specifically, moderated regression analysis was used
to test whether the top management commitment (TMC), safety-related human
resources (SHR), and safety management system (SMS), as moderators (m), influence
the impact of crew job satisfaction (CJS), local management involvement (LMI), and
crew psychological safety (CPS), as independent variables (x) on the crew safety
behavior (CSB) as dependent variable (y).
Subsequently, nine models were examined using the SPSS tool as follows:
Model 1 regressed CSB on CJS and TMC, and the product of TMC and CJS.
Model 2 regressed CSB on CPS and TMC and the product of TMC and CPS.
Model 3 regressed CSB on LMI and TMC and the product of TMC and LMI.
Model 4 regressed CSB on CJS and SHR and the product of SHR and CJS.
Model 5 regressed CSB on CPS and SHR and the product of SHR and CPS.
Model 6 regressed CSB on LMI and SHR, and the product of SHR and LI
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Model 7 regressed CSB on CJS and SMS and the product of SMS and CJS.
Model 8 regressed CSB on CPS and SMS and the product of SMS and CPS.
Model 9 regressed CSB on LMI and SMS and the product of SMS and LMI.
First, as discussed before, to avoid multicollinearity, the moderators (TMC, SHR,
and SMS) and the independent variables (CJS, LMI, and CPS) were centered by
extracting the related mean for each variable. Table 12 and Table 13 show the results
of the regression analyses.
Table 12: Impacts of Crew Job Satisfaction (CJS), Crew Psychological Safety (CPS)
and Local Management Involvement (LMI) on Crew Safety Behavior (CSB)
Moderated by the Top Management Commitment (TMC).

Interpretation: Table 12 indicates that no significant evidence (p<.05) exists
that top management commitment (TMC) moderates or influences the impact of crew
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job satisfaction (CJS), and crew psychological safety (CPS) on the crew safety
behavior (CSB). However, there are significant evidence (p>0.05) that the top
management commitment (TMC) moderates by 10.4% the impact of the local
management involvement (LMI) on the crew safety behavior (CSB).

Table 13. Impact of Crew Job Satisfaction (CJS), Crew Psychological Safety (CPS)
and Local Management Involvement (LMI) on Crew Safety Behavior (CSB)
Moderated by the Safety Human Resources (SHR).

Interpretation: Table 13 shows that no significant evidence (p<.05) exists that
safety-related human resources (SHR) influences or moderates the impact of local
management involvement (LMI) on the crew safety behavior (CSB). However, there
is significant evidence (p>0.05) that safety human resource increases the impact of

61

crew job satisfaction (CJS), and crew psychological safety (CPS) on the crew safety
behavior (CSB) by 12.3% and 16.9%, respectively.
Table 14. Impact of Crew Job Satisfaction (CJS), Crew Psychological Safety (CPS)
and Local Management Involvement (LMI) on Crew Safety Behavior (CSB)
Moderated by the Safety Management System (SMS).

Interpretation: Table 14 shows that no significant evidence (p<.05) exists that
the safety management system (SMS) influences or moderates the impact of crew job
satisfaction (CJS) and crew psychological safety (CPS) on the crew safety behavior
(CSB). However, there is significant evidence (p>0.05) that the safety management
system (SMS) moderates by 11.7% the impact of local management involvement
(LMI) on the crew safety behavior (CSB).
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To conclude, the regression analysis in two steps, linear and then moderated,
provided deep understanding regarding the relationship between the safety culture
factors. Specifically, it provided an explanation about how the organizational factors
(TMC, SMS, and SHR) affect safety culture, especially crew member safety behavior
that has direct influence on safety outcomes, as argued by many researchers, e.g., Yu
et al. (2021); He et al. (2020); Aryee and Hsiung (2016). Figure 12 recapitulates the
findings of the regression analyses.
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Figure 12. Safety Culture Model, Including Moderation Effects of Organizational Factors (Source: researcher)
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4.4.

Summary of the Main Findings
This study investigated the existence of different safety subcultures in the same

shipping company as a result of differing the organizational culture between the
company’s divisions. A case study of shipping companies operating both ocean-going
and domestic ships with the interchanging crews was examined to achieve this aim.
The results of the study are as follows.
1. Results of the Exploratory Survey:
The exploratory survey consisted of six interviews with Masters, Chief
Engineers, an ISM Code inspector, and a Classification Society inspector. They were
conducted to investigate the differences regarding safety culture between the two
shipping company’s activities (i.e., International and domestic shipping). The results
summarized the differences in four main categories related to safety culture: (1) top
management, (2) shipboard safety climate, (3) job satisfaction, and (4) pressure and
stress on board ships. Based on the details of these themes (i.e., fifteen themes), a
measurement tool of safety culture was developed. It covered different topics
suggested to have a link to safety culture. Furthermore, one main hypothesis (H1) was
formulated to facilitate addressing the first objective of the research (see Section
4.1.3).
2. Result of the Safety Culture Survey:
The survey questionnaire was first assessed, validated and reconstructed using
Exploratory Factor Analysis of the SPSS tool. It yielded in the extraction of eight
factors: Top management commitment, safety management system, safety-related
human resources, local management involvement, crew psychological safety, crew job
satisfaction, external supervision pressure, and crew safety behavior.
The correlation analysis showed that local management involvement and crew
safety behavior are highly correlated with the overall safety culture level. Therefore,
they represented reliable predictors and indicators of positive safety culture level.
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Furthermore, the correlation analysis resulted in high correlation between local
management involvement and crew safety behavior and the crew psychological safety,
and between the safety management system and the crew safety behavior. However,
the results showed no significate correlation between the external supervision pressure
and all the remaining seven factors.
The comparative analysis of safety culture factors concluded that there are
statistically significant differences between the extracted safety culture factors in
ocean-going and domestic ships, except for the crew psychological safety and the
perceived pressure introduced by external supervisions. In particular, the results
showed a significant difference in the top management commitment towards safety.
Therefore, the research statistically supported the main hypothesis H1 that, “the
organizational culture affects safety culture and results in subcultures of safety in the
same organization, even with the same employees with the same qualifications”.
Then, to investigate the mechanism by which the organizational management
of safety affect safety culture, the research conducted linear and moderated regression
analyses, resulting in constructing a safety culture model as proposed by Figure 12. In
particular, it was found that:
a. The top management commitment and the safety management system
moderate the impact of local management involvement on crew safety
behavior.
b. Safety-related human resource increases the impact of the crew job
satisfaction and the crew psychological safety on the crew safety behavior.
The next chapter discusses in depth the study’s findings and limitations and
aligns them with the literature. In addition, it provides conclusion and
recommendations for further research.
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5. CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This chapter provides a summary of the study, a discussion of the findings
and conclusion, as well as the limitations and recommendations for future research.

5.1.

Summary of the Study
This study investigated the existence of different subcultures of safety as a

result of the existence of different organizational subcultures in the same shipping
company. To achieve this aim, a case study of an Algerian shipping company operating
both ocean-going and domestic ships with the same seafarers was examined. Three
research objectives were outlined to help achieve the main aim of the study:
1. Identifying the key elements associated with safety culture that influence
safety of both ocean-going and domestic ships.
2. Examining the existence of different subcultures of safety as a result of
the existence of different organizational subcultures.
3. Investigating the influences of the organizational factors on safety culture
onboard both ocean-going and domestic ships.
To conduct this research, an exploratory mixed method was applied. The
qualitative data collection part, consisting of six semi-structured interviews with
maritime experts (see section 3.4.1), explored the research topic and assisted in
designing the questionnaire of safety culture measurement. The survey questionnaire
served for quantitatively collecting seafarers’ perceptions regarding different aspects
related to safety culture onboard ocean-going and domestic ships in Algeria. The first
research objective was achieved through analyzing the content of the interviews and
conducting an exploratory factor analysis and a correlation analysis of the quantitative
data. While the second research objective was achieved through comparative analysis

67

and hypotheses testing, the third objective utilized regression analysis (see Figure 8).
The study findings are discussed next.

5.2.

Discussion of the Findings
As mentioned above, the study included three research objectives. The first and

the third research objectives involved answering research questions, while the second
research objective consisted of verifying a research hypothesis.
Research Objective One
“Identifying the key elements that influence safety culture of both ocean-going and
domestic ships.
Research question (Q1): What are the factors influencing safety within international
and domestic shipping activities and bearing on safety culture.
To answer research question Q1, both qualitative and quantitative data
analyses were utilized. Content analysis of the interviews yielded a classification of
the factors associated with safety culture that impact safety of both ocean-going and
domestic ships in four main categories: organizational safety management included
two themes; shipboard safety climate included eleven themes; job satisfaction included
one theme; and pressure and stress on board ships included two themes (see section
4.1.1).
Supported by the literature of safety culture assessment and based on the
details of interviews analysis themes, a measurement tool of safety culture was
developed. It covered different topics suggested having a link to safety culture
(Appendix B : Safety Culture Survey Questionnaire refers), the exploratory factor
analysis of the quantitative data using the SPSS tool resulted in the extraction of eight
factors: (1) top management commitment, (2) safety management system, (3) safetyrelated human resources, (4) local management involvement, (5) crew psychological
safety, (6) crew job satisfaction, (7) external supervision pressure, and (8) crew safety
behavior.
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Subsequently, to statistically answer the research question, a correlation
analysis of the eight safety culture factors was conducted. The results showed that all
the safety culture factors, except external supervision pressure, were highly correlated
with the overall safety culture. The correlation analysis results led to state, as an answer
to the research question (Q1), that the above highlighted factors, except the external
supervision pressure, are key elements extremely linked to safety culture of both
ocean-going and domestic ships. Furthermore, they could be considered highly reliable
predictors and indicators of safety culture of ocean-going and domestic ships.
These findings, regarding the key elements associated with and affecting safety
culture, supported the statement given by Steve, Felin and Murdey (2007) when they
indicated that the organization's commitment and workforce involvement are the only
two factors replicated across studies. Furthermore, these research findings are, to a
large extent, in line with several previous studies. For instance, in this study, crew job
satisfaction and crew psychological safety showed significant influence on safety
culture and were similarly found by some other studies. Specifically, the literature
refers to these factors as psychological well-being and considers it as a critical
dimension that influences both safety and work efficiency within safety-critical
organizations, such as the shipping industry (Alagaraja, 2020; der Kinderen et al.,
2020; Bergheim et al., 2015).
The alignments of the findings regarding safety culture dimensions were found
in separate studies; however, this study contributed to the safety culture measurement
by combining these dimensions (i.e., factors) under one umbrella. This may result in a
comprehensive understanding of how these dimensions influence each other and affect
the overall safety culture.
Research Objective Two
“Examining the existence of different subcultures of safety as a result of the
existence of different organizational subcultures.”
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Hypothesis (H1): the organizational subculture affects safety culture and results in
respective subcultures of safety in the same organization, even with the same
employees with the same qualifications.
This research objective was addressed through statistical analysis of the
quantitative data. However, the qualitative part also served to achieve this research
objective. Indeed, personal interviews were conducted to also investigate the
differences regarding safety culture between the two shipping companies’ activities
(i.e., international and domestic shipping). The analysis of the interviews showed a
high likelihood of the existence of different safety subcultures as a result of the
different organizational subcultures. To facilitate addressing statistically this second
research objective, the researcher formulated the hypothesis (H1) mentioned above.
To test this hypothesis, the researcher conducted a comparative analysis. The
purpose was to investigate whether there are significant differences in safety culture
between ocean-going and domestic ships. The analysis statistically compared the mean
values of each safety culture factor between the two types of ships. The results
provided evidence that there are significant differences in all the compared safety
culture factors between ocean-going and domestic ships, except for external
supervision pressure and crew psychological safety. This fact led to support the
hypothesis that organizational subcultures affect safety culture and result in
subcultures of safety in the same organization even with the same employees with the
same qualifications.
Thus, regarding the second research objective, the study findings statistically
confirmed that the existence of different organizational subcultures in the same
shipping company affects safety culture and results in respective subcultures of safety
on board ships, even with the same employees with the same qualifications.
Additionally, the research findings showed that external supervision, such as
Port State Control (PSC), Flag State Control (FSC), and other external safety
supervisions have marginal relationship with safety culture onboard ships. It was also
found that crew psychological safety does not differ between ocean-going and
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domestic ships. Apropos this last finding, the research suggests that the fact of
maintaining the same score of psychological safety between the two types of ships in
the same organization is probably linked to the fact that all the participants belong to
the same national culture. Given the fact that psychological safety at the workplace
depends largely on the interactions within the teamwork, including teamwork
cohesion, trust, leaders’ authority style, and the relationship between the superiors and
followers, this last finding support Hofstede’s model dimensions: power distance,
collectivism versus individualism, and uncertainty avoidance index (see section
2.2.3.2), the findings support Hofstede’s (2011) statement that the cultural model’s
dimensions are preserved in organizations when operating within the same national
culture.
Research Objective Three

“Investigating the way by which the shipping company’ management of safety
can improve safety culture of domestic ships and align it with the one of the
ocean-going ships.”
Research question (Q2): In what way does a shipping company management7 of
safety contribute to a difference in safety culture between its different divisions such
as for example, international and domestic shipping divisions?
The research question Q2 related to the third research objective was
investigated through regression analysis of the quantitative data. Linear regression
analyses were first performed to define the influence direction of each factor of safety
culture on the other factors. It was found that the organizational factors, including top
management commitment, safety management system, and safety-related human
resources, influence each other and at the same time affect the shipboard safety climate
factors, including crew job satisfaction, crew psychological safety, local management
involvement, and crew safety behavior. Additionally, it was found that local

7

According to ISO-9001, management refers to the control of resources, and other aspects of the
organization that require monitoring.
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management involvement and crew job satisfaction have a significant influence on
crew safety behavior.
Moreover, to answer the research question and properly address this third
objective, the study investigated further the influence of the organizational factors (i.e.,
top management commitment, safety management system, and safety-related human
resources) on the shipboard safety climate factors. For this purpose, a moderated
regression analysis was conducted. The results of this regression analysis indicated the
following:
In addition to the direct influence of the organizational factors on each other and each
factor of the shipboard safety climate:
1. Top management commitment and safety management system moderate the
impact of local management involvement on crew safety behavior. This means
that the failure in the local management involvement can be compensated by a
top management commitment and adequate and effective safety management
system; however,
2. Safety-related human resource increases the impact of the crew job satisfaction
and the crew psychological safety on the crew safety behavior. This means that
people with a high qualification are more vulnerable to the impact of their job
dissatisfaction and the environment of low psychological safety. This fact led to
conclude that shipping companies should take into consideration crew members’
qualifications, their job satisfaction and the shipboard psychological safety
environment to ensure a high level of crew safety behavior. Specifically, for
shipping companies operating ocean-going and domestic ships, considering the
seafarers’ qualifications when manning the ships is of prime importance to ensure
an optimal level of job satisfaction and adequate psychological safety.
Part of the findings of this third research objective is in line with other studies.
In fact, several studies indicated that the organizational factors, including the
organizational management commitment and prioritization of safety, significantly
influence the employees’ motivation and striving for success, and this fact may impact
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the employees’ involvement in safety that would affect, in turn, the safety culture level,
e.g., Li et al. (2021); Nurcholis & Qurniawati (2020); Ang-Jun et al. (2018); Horwitz
(2017); Cavus and Gokcen (2015). However, this study, by introducing the moderation
effect of the organizational factors, provided a comprehensive overview regarding the
mechanisms by which the organizational factors affect safety culture. Furthermore, the
study culminated in developing a safety culture model (see Figure 12). The model can
be used in practice for improving the safety culture of both ocean-going and domestic
ships.

5.3.

Conclusion

This study was triggered by a question found in the literature regarding how
organizational subcultures affect safety cultures in organizations. The reviewed
literature seemed to have no clear answer. Relevant literature covering organizational
culture and safety culture, including safety culture in shipping, provided a theoretical
framework for the study. Then, the researcher carried out a case study of international
versus domestic shipping activities in Algeria. Specifically, the study targeted shipping
companies operating both ocean-going and domestic ships. Seafarers in both types of
ships have the same qualification required by the STCW Convention, and in most
cases, they work interchangeably between these types of ships. The starting point was
that the organizational cultures in managing these two types of activities are supposed
to be different in the same shipping companies (i.e., two different organizational
subcultures). To investigate the impact of this fact on safety culture, the study applied
an exploratory mixed method. The exploratory part consisted of six interviews with
maritime professionals who have abundant experience in working closely with both
types of ships (i.e., two Master, two Chief Engineers, one ISM Code auditor, and one
classification society inspector). This exploratory study provided relevant information
regarding the managerial and the shipboard’s attitudes, behaviors, and practices
associated with different aspects of safety culture, such as prioritization of safety,
safety management system, training, documentation, communication, safety
participation, and safety compliance. The interviews analysis results assisted the
research in constructing the safety measurement tools and formulate a hypothesis (H1:
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the organizational subculture affects safety culture and results in respective
subcultures of safety in the same organization, even with the same employees with the
same qualification). The measurement tool aimed to collect seafarers’ perceptions
regarding different aspects of safety culture. Thus, the objectives of the research and
the validation of the hypothesis were achieved by analyzing statistically the
questionnaire data collected.
First, the study identified seven key elements affecting safety culture onboard
ocean-going and domestic ships in the same company: top management commitment,
safety management system, safety-related human resource, local management
involvement, crew psychological safety, crew job satisfaction, a crew safety behavior.
External supervision, such as Port and Flag State controls has shown weak influence
on safety culture in comparison to the seven aforementioned elements.
Second, the study concluded that different organizational cultures will result in
differing safety cultures. In other words, organizational subcultures result in safety
subcultures in the same organization, even with the same people.
Third, in investigating the way the organizational culture affects safety culture, it
was found that the organizational factors relative to the management of safety,
including top management commitment, safety human resource, and safety
management system affect each other and the shipload’s safety climate, including local
management commitment, crew job satisfaction, crew psychological safety, and crew
safety behavior. It was also found that the organizational factors influence or moderate
the impact of the shipboard’s safety climate factors on each other. According to the
last findings, it was concluded that the shipping companies, operating both oceangoing and domestic ships, should take into consideration together with the
qualification of seafarers and their job satisfaction when manning ships to ensure an
optimal level of safety culture. Furthermore, it was found that the interaction between
the local management involvement and company management of safety (i.e., top
management commitment and safety management system) impacts crew safety
behavior. Specifically, good local management involvement can compensate for the
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failure in the organizational factors as well as the failure in the local management
commitment can be compensated by the organizational factors.

5.4.

Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research
Like any other study, this study involved some strengths and limitations. In

this study, the measurement tool was constructed based on an exploratory survey, the
next step should include a statistical examination of the structure of the instrument’s
factors through confirmatory factor analysis. The strength of this study was that the
findings were based on objective data. In fact, the interviewees were carefully selected
and

a

quantitative

data

was

collected

from

a

sample

of
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seafarers. Then, the findings were obtained using a mixed-method, through content
analysis of the interviews and statistical analysis of the quantitative data (i.e.,
questionnaire data). However, there were some limitations of the study. For instance,
the number of shipping companies operating both ocean-going and domestic ships was
small, with only two companies.
Also, an inherent limitation of survey research was the inability to investigate
for more deep information based on the self-reported responses. In this concern, the
researcher recognized that seafarers may not always report the real perceptions,
believes, opinions, and feelings existed in practice, regarding the question asked about
safety culture aspects. Thus, further research should involve qualitative data methods
based on structured interviews or focus groups with seafarers. Also, close observations
and audits may contribute to collect more precise data. Indeed, it is easier for the
researcher to observe safety behaviors than to measure safety-related attitudes, values,
and beliefs.
Regarding the outcomes of this study, the findings related to the moderation effect
are of prime importance and can feed other studies concerned with the modeling and
the optimization of the maritime safety culture; in this context, further research is
recommended to develop and exploit these findings.
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Appendix B : Safety Culture Survey Questionnaire

Consent Form
Dear Participant
In this survey I want to assess how safety is handled on board ships in Algeria and how the crew
perceives safety. This is part of my Master’s dissertation at the World Maritime University (WMU), which
aims to improve our understanding of how various safety-related aspects work in practice. The
dissertation research is being undertaken under the supervision of Dr Anish Hebbar, Assistant Professor
MSEA and he can be reached at ah@wmu.se
This questionnaire includes five sections. In each section, the participant is invited to answer a
range question, as per the scale indicated. All the information obtained through the survey is anonymous.
There will not be any possibility to trace any answers to the individuals, companies or vessels. As a WMU
student, my work will be carried out in line with the World Maritime University (WMU) guidelines for
research ethics, which among other things protect your right to be anonymous. Only I will handle the
completed forms or have other access to the data.
To optimise the quality of the survey, it is important that as many people as possible complete the
form. It will take about 25 minutes to complete the form. It is also important that the questions are
answered as frankly as possible. When you have completed the paper format of the questionnaire, kindly
deliver it to the chosen contact person onboard for this survey. If you have chosen the electronic format,
kindly return the filled-in questionnaire to the undersigned at kah.nadiro@gmail.com
-

-

As regards the answering of the questions on the form itself, please
relate your answers to the circumstance on board this particular
vessel.
As regards comments and suggestions for improvements, you can
relate these to the experience you have in shipping in general.

If you have any questions, comments or suggestions regarding this survey, feel
free to contact me, KAHLOUCHE Nadhir, at kah.nadiro@gmail.com, or by WhatsApp/
Viber no. (+213) 774465167.
Thank you very much in advance for taking the time to fill in the questionnaire!
Yours sincerely,
Nadhir.
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Participant Background and Information:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Gender:
Female/ Male
Age: Under 25 years / 25-30 years / 36-45 years /46 – 55 years / Above 56 years
My ship sails in: International waters/ National waters
•
My company is:
How long have you been working for this company: less than 5 years/ 5-10 years/ 11-15 years/16-20 years/ More than 20 years
How long have you been working in shipping? less than 5 years/ 5-10 years/ 11-15 years/16-20 years/ More than 20 years
Which kind of employment contract do you have? Permanent contract / Temporary contact
My position/rank on board: Officer-Deck Department/ Officer-Engine Department/ Seaman-Deck department/Seaman-Engine department/
Cratering/Hotel Department.

Please read the statement below and circle the letter of your
answer.

Strongly disagree:
A

Disagree: B

Neutral: C

SECTION 1: Organizational Safety Management
01 The top management ashore in my company prioritizes safety over commercial operations.
02 We do not get clear information about incidents that happen on board other vessels of the company.
03 The shipboard management receives positive feedback when raising safety issues to the company management.
04 The punishment for violating the company’s safety rules is fair.
05 Here, we see improvements before something has gone wrong.
SECTION 2: The Shipboard Safety Climate
06 The captain can say” stop”/” time out” to the company if the safety of the crew onboard is threatened.
07 My immediate superior onboard does not care how we do our work as long as the work gets done.
08 I voluntary carry out some activities that I assume it can improve safety on board my ship.
09 We receive adequate safety-related information when we sign on / start a new sailing period.
10 To cover mistakes, undesirable incidents onboard are “fixed up” and not reported.
11 Minor incidents are not reported in writing on my vessel.
12 I report my mistakes in work to my superior without any fear of punishment or blame.
13 I have to violate procedures due to the company or the superiors ‘demand for efficiency of work.

Agree: D

Strongly agree:
F

A
A
A
A
A

B
B
B
B
B

C
C
C
C
C

D
D
D
D
D

E
E
E
E
E

A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A

B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B

C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C

D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D

E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E

87

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

We carry out a “Safe Job/ Risk Analysis” before high-risk operations or new working methods/ tools are introduced.
The crew members do not care about the use of protective equipment in location where and when it is mandatory
I can tell the captain to” stop”/” time out” if we feel that safety is threatened
The procedures in the safety management system (SMS) of my company are clear and helpful in my work.
The training received is not fully relevant in practice to work safely on-board vessels.
The training received is not sufficient to handle critical or hazardous situations on board vessels.
The size of crew on board this vessel is not adequate to ensure both, timely work and safety.
To get the work done, I have to work overtime, at the cost of my hours of rest.
I don’t feel sufficiently rested to carry out my tasks in a safe manner on my shift.
I am unable to participate in the safety meetings onboard due to the workload onboard.
The current working situation onboard is less physically challenging than a couple of years ago.
The safety documentation we need is available and up to date onboard.
To perform the work safely, the documentation language used onboard is well understood by all the users.
Every new crew member gets a thorough introduction to safety-related issues.
The work here, apart from the watch duties, is performed individually.
We solve problems and conflicts between the crew members in a good manner.
The team discusses and communicates effectively about work and safety.
My immediate superior is not afraid of admitting his own mistakes.
My immediate superior has very little confidence in his co-workers.
My co-workers avoid asking for help in work so as to avoid looking incompetent.
I enjoy my job.
This company is a good employer compared to others.
I am not satisfied with my salary in this company.
I feel satisfied regarding the promotion in my career in this company.
I care more about not losing my job.
I do not feel appreciated by my superiors and co-workers onboard.

A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A

B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B

C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C

D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D

E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
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SECTION 3: Pressure and Stress on Board ships
40 The current working situation onboard is less stressful than a couple of years ago.
41 Being away from my family for a long time, for me, it is not a source of stress
42 For me, my work on board at sea itself is a source of stress.
43 The inspection carried out by the port state introduces an extra pressure and stress on the crew.
44 Inspections and audits carried out by flag sate or delegated organisms introduce an extra pressure and stress on crew.
45 External safety inspection or audit carried onboard have on relation with the crew’s stress.
46 During this pandemic period, I have experienced more stress onboard.

A
A
A
A
A
A
A

B
B
B
B
B
B
B

C
C
C
C
C
C
C

D
D
D
D
D
D
D

E
E
E
E
E
E
E
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Appendix C: Personal Interviews

Interview Consent Form
Dear Participant,
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research survey, which is carried out in connection
with a Dissertation which will be written by the interviewer, in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Maritime Affairs at the World Maritime
University in Malmo, Sweden.
The topic of the Dissertation is: Organizational subcultures and Safety Culture in Shipping- Case
study of Algeria.
The information provided by you in this interview will be used for research purposes and the
results will form part of a dissertation, which will be published online and made available to the
public. Your personal information will not be published. You may withdraw from the research at
any time, and your personal data will be immediately deleted.
Anonymised research data will be archived on a secure virtual drive linked to a World Maritime
University email address. All the data will be deleted as soon as the degree is awarded.
Your participation in the interview is highly appreciated.

Student’s name
Specialization
Email address

KAHLOUCHE Nadhir.
Maritime Safety and Environmental Administration (MSEA).
w1802448@wmu.se
***

I consent to my personal data, as outlined above, being used for this study. I understand that all
personal data relating to participants is held and processed in the strictest confidence, and will
be deleted at the end of the researcher’s enrolment.

Name:

………………………………………………………………………

Signature:

………………………………………………………………………
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Date:

………………………………………………………………………

Quotation Agreement:
I also understand that my words may be quoted directly. With regards to being quoted, please
initial next to any of the statements that you agree with:
I wish to review the notes, transcripts, or other data collected during the research
pertaining to my participation.
I agree to be quoted directly.
I agree to be quoted directly if my name is not published and a made-up name
(pseudonym) is used.
I agree that the researchers may publish documents that contain quotations by me.
By signing this form, I agree that;
I am voluntarily taking part in this project. I understand that I don’t have to take part, and I can
stop the interview at any time;
The transcribed interview or extracts from it may be used as described above;
I have read the Information sheet;
I don’t expect to receive any benefit or payment for my participation;
I can request a copy of the transcript of my interview and may make edits;
I have been able to ask any questions I might have, and I understand that I am free to contact
the researcher with any questions I may have in the future.

Participant’s name and signature:

Date:

Contact Information:
This research has been reviewed and approved by the World Maritime University Research
Ethics Committee. If you have any additional questions or concerns about this project, please
contact:
Student’s name: KAHLOUCHE Nadhir
Specialization: Maritime Safety and Environmental Administration (MSEA).
E-mail: w1802448@wmu.se

91

You can also contact research supervisor:
Supervisor’s name: Dr. Anish Hebbar
Position: Assistant Professor, MSEA
E-mail : ah@wmu.se

Interview Questions
Personnel information:
Name of participant:
Company or institution:
Position:
Year of experience:
According to the interviewee’s background, the questions asked to each participant
were selected from the following list:
1. In your opinion, what are the main differences regarding safety culture between
ocean-going and domestic ships?
2. How do you handle crew members, onboard ocean-going and domestic ships, who
do not follow safety regulations? Do you take care about their job security for
example because of the punishment consequences?
3. Do you face usually conflicting requirement from the company /captains/superiors to
do the work efficiently against the safety of the crew on board? Are there differences
between ocean-going and domestic ships in this matter? What do you do to resolve
this conflict?
4. What do you think is the most stressful on-board ocean-going and domestic ships?
5. What are the challenges that face shipping compagnies operating both type of ships
to have the same safety culture on board ships, whatever, ocean-going or domestic?
6. How can the organization management of safety be responsible for creating
differences in safety culture on board ships?
7. What qualities do you think are important in a captain and chief engineer position as
manager and leaders on board ships?
8. For the top management in the shipping company, what is the most important
indicator that can be used to determine whether companies have safety culture issues
on board their ships before an accident occurs?
9. If management commitment in shipping is fully behind safety culture change and
enhancement on board their ships to prevent accidents, how likely is this
management to succeed in practice?
10. If you had to say, in your opinion, what is the most important ingredient or secret in
the positive safety culture change, especially in shipping? Please elaborate.
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11. When evaluating the effectiveness of the company safety management system on
board ships, in your opinion, which are the most criteria to define this success and
how can you measure it?
12. What do you believe is an area that can be used (in the training for example) to help
seafarer becomes aware about safety?
13. What is the biggest challenge to ensure a positive safety culture change in shipping?
And specifically in domestic shipping? Please elaborate.
14. What are the most important factors of the human element that shipping companies
need to address to ensure a just safety culture on board their ships? Please elaborate.
15. In your opinion, in Shipping, is safety and culture change expensive? Could you
elaborate your opinion please?

93

Appendix D: The Construction of the Survey Questionnaire

Category

Theme

Organization
Management of
Safety

Prioritizing safety over commercial operation

Related
Questions
Q1

Proactive approach in improving safety

Q2- Q3- Q4- Q5

Master and superiors’ prioritization of safety
Reporting system
Safety Behavior

Q6- Q7
Q10- Q11- Q12
Q8- Q9- Q13Q14- Q15- Q16
Q17- Q27
Q18- Q19
Q20
Q21- Q23

Shipboard Safety
Climate

Effectiveness of the SMS’s procedures
Adequacy of safety training
Adequacy of safe manning level
Tradeoff between work efficiency and
Safety.
Fatigue
Adequacy of documentation
Teamwork environment
Safety communication

Job satisfaction

Job satisfaction

Pressure and Stress
on board ships

Pressure of external safety supervisions
Other stressors on board ships

Q22- Q24
Q25- Q26
Q28- Q29
Q30- Q31- Q32Q33
Q34- Q35- Q36Q37- Q38- Q39
Q43- Q44- Q45
Q40- Q41- Q42Q46
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Appendix E: Reconstruction of the questionnaire according to
the Exploratory Facture Analysis
Safety Culture Survey (alpha- 0.921)
Top Management Commitment (TMC) (Alpha - 0.764; Eigenvalues 2.042; %
of variance= 68.069)
Q1. The top management ashore in my company prioritizes safety over commercial
operations.
Q3. The shipboard management receives positive feedback when they raise safety
issues to the company management.
Q5. Here, we see improvements before something has gone wrong.
Safety Management System (SMS) (alpha- 0.782; Eigenvalues 2.687; % of
variance= 53.749)
Q25.The safety documentation we need is available and up to date onboard.
Q26.To perform the work safely, the documentation language used onboard is well
understood by all the users.
Q9. We receive adequate safety-related information when we sign on / start a new
sailing period.
Q17.The procedures in the safety management system (SMS) of my company are
clear and helpful in my work.
Q27.Every new crew member gets a thorough introduction to safety-related issues.
Safety Human Resources (SHR) (alpha- 0.749; Eigenvalues 2.025, % of
variance 67.541)
Q18.The training received is not fully relevant in practice to work safely on-board
vessels. (inversed)
Q19.The training received is not sufficient to handle critical or hazardous situations
on board vessels. (inversed)
Q20.The size of crew on board this vessel is not adequate to ensure both, timely
work and safety. (Inversed)
Local Management Involvement (LMI) (alpha- 0.770; Eigenvalues 2.780, % of
variance 46.337)
Q4. The punishment for violating company safety rules is not fair. (inversed)
Q6. The captain can say” stop”/” time out” to the company if the safety of the
crew onboard is threatened.
Q7. My immediate superior onboard does not care how we do our work as long as
the work gets done. (inversed)
Q11. Minor incidents are not reported in writing on my vessel. (inversed)
Q23. I am unable to participate in the safety meetings onboard due to the workload
onboard. (inversed)
Q10. To cover mistakes, undesirable incidents onboard are “fixed up” and not
reported. (inversed)
Crew Psychological safety (CPS) (alpha- 0.747; Eigenvalues 2.692, % of
variance 44.865)
Q29. We solve problems and conflicts between the crew members in a good
manner.
Q30. The team discusses and communicates effectively about work and safety.
Q31. My immediate superior is not afraid of admitting his own mistakes.

Loading
0.845
0.821
0.808

0.610
0.576
0.616
0.585
0.728

0.882
0.896
0.666

0.579
0.612
0.739
0.721
0.630
0.779

0.631
0.764
0.728
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Q32. My immediate superior has very little confidence in his co-workers.
(inversed)
Q33. My co-workers avoid asking for help in work so as to avoid looking
incompetent. (inversed)
Q39. I do not feel appreciated by my superiors and co-workers onboard. (inversed)
Crew Safety Behavior (CSB)(alpha- 0.711; Eigenvalues 2.478, % of variance
41.301)
Q13. I have to violate procedures due to the company or the superiors ‘demand for
efficiency of work. (inversed)
Q14. I carry out a “Safe Job/ Risk Analysis” before high-risk operations or new
working methods/ tools are introduced.
Q15 The crew members do not care about the use of required protective equipment
where and when it is mandatory (inversed)
Q8. I voluntary carry out some activities that I assume it can improve safety on
board my ship.
Q16. I tell the captain to” stop”/” time out” if I feel that safety is threatened
Q12. I report my mistakes in work to my superior without any fear of punishment
or blame.
Job Satisfaction (alpha- 0.678; Eigenvalues 2.104, % of variance 42.082)
Q34. I enjoy my job.
Q35. This company is a good employer compared to others.
Q36. I am not satisfied with my salary in this company.
Q37. I feel satisfied regarding the promotion in my career in this company.
Q38. I am not satisfied with the work conditions on board.
External Supervision Pressure (ESP) (alpha- 0.806; Eigenvalues 1.909, % of
variance 63.631)
Q43. The inspection carried out by the port state introduces an extra pressure and
stress on the crew.
Q44. Inspections and audits carried out by flag sate or delegated organisms
introduce an extra pressure and stress on the crew.
Q45. External safety inspection or audit carried onboard have no relation with the
crew’s stress (inversed)

0.675
0.627
0.577

0.720
0.741
0.637
0.513
0.660
0.553

0.525
0.745
0.493
0.654
0.776

0.859
0.811
0.716

Remaining questions (not considered in any section due to reliability issues)
Q24. The current working situation onboard is less physically challenging than a couple of years
ago
Q40. The current working situation onboard is less stressful than a couple of years ago.
Q21. To get the work done, I have to work overtime, at the cost of my hours of rest. (inversed)
Q22. I don’t feel sufficiently rested to carry out my tasks in a safe manner on my shift. (inversed)
Q28. The work here, apart from the watch duties, is performed individually.
Q41. Being away from my family for a long time, for me, it is not a source of stress
Q42. For me, my work on board at sea itself is a source of stress.
Q46. During this pandemic period, I have experienced more stress onboard.
Q2. We do not get clear information about incidents that happen on board other vessels of the
company.

96

